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PREDICTING FAILURES OF LARGE U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
Since 2007 several banks have fallen into bankruptcy in the U.S. What is historically notable in 
this situation is the amount of assets lost in bankruptcies that are already measured in hundreds 
of billions of dollars. Since financial institutions magnitude to the current economic system is 
crucial, bank failures have a dramatic impact also on real economy. Therefore, feasible bank 
failure prediction models can also diminish the real economy problems.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study how accurately recent U.S. commercial bank failures can be 
predicted with logistic regression model utilizing financial statement variables. With the overall 
predictability of the model, also the statistical significance of the independent variables is studied. 
In  addition,  it  is  tested  how  the  prediction  accuracy  reduces  as  the  timeframe  from  the  
bankruptcy prolongs from one quarter to three years. 
 
The evolution and history of bankruptcy prediction models and banking crises is also studied in 
order to develop the base for the bank failure model. It is also noted that several bankruptcy 
prediction models contain financial statement variables. In addition, by studying the history of 
the banking crises it is noticed that traditional banking factors such as liquidity, credit risk, and 
profitability have a substantial impact on failures of individual financial institutions. It is also 
argued that banks’ exposure to the subprime related securities might deteriorate the solvency of 
the financial institutions. 
 
The data of the analysis in gathered from the FDIC database. It contains bank-specific variables 
from 2004 to 2009 including 124 commercial banks with total assets worth more than 500 million 
dollars. In the empirical part of the thesis it is noted that 25 independent variables are statistically 
significant for the bank failure prediction. On the other hand, several of these explanatory 
variables correlate significantly with each other, erasing the possibility to include all the 
statistically significant variables into the same model. Therefore, 72 potential models are 
constructed, which are then studied with the help of logistic regression. After short and long-
term analysis it can be noticed that the most accurate failure prediction is provided by the model 
having nonaccrual rate, loan diversification, return on equity, capital growth, tax exposure, CMO 
ratio, uninsured deposits, risk free securities, dividend rate, loan growth, assets variation, and 
liquid  assets  as  the  explanatory  variables.  The  accuracy  of  the  model  is  measured  by  correctly  
classified (CC) percentage figure. The model in question can predict 95.16% of failures correctly 
one quarter prior the bankruptcies. CC figure is 82.26% one year, 72.58% two years, and 71.77% 
three years prior the bank failures.  
 
The analysis recovers, however, that only two of the explanatory variables, nonaccrual rate and 
risk free loans, are both statistically significant in the long-term and consistent with time. 
Although the model with only two explanatory variables tends to lose some of its predicting 
accuracy, it permits a precise analysis of the independent coefficients. It can be confirmed that 
only one percentage point increase in nonaccrual rate at least doubles the bankruptcy probability. 
On the other hand, the more the bank ties its investments to risk free securities the greater the 
probability that the bank survives. Empirical analysis proves also that the logit model is slightly 
more suitable for bank failure prediction than the corresponding probit model.  
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SUURTEN YHDYSVALTALAISTEN PANKKIEN KONKURSSIENNUSTAMINEN 
 
Vuodesta 2007 lähtien lukuisat yhdysvaltalaiset pankit ovat vajonneet konkurssiin. On 
historiallisesti merkittävää, että hävittyjen pääomien summa määritellään jo sadoissa miljardeissa 
dollareissa. Koska pankit ovat nykyisessä talousjärjestelmässä hyvinkin merkittävässä asemassa, 
heijastuvat pankkikonkurssit voimakkaasti myös reaalitalouteen. Näin ollen konkurssien 
ennustaminen ei ainoastaan tarjoa arvokasta informaatiota pankkisektorille, vaan on merkittävässä 
asemassa myös reaalitalouden ongelmien vähentämisessä. 
 
Tämän tutkielman tarkoituksena on tarkastella kuinka tarkasti pankkikonkursseja voidaan 
ennustaa logistisella regressiolla pankkien tunnuslukuja hyväksi käyttäen. Kokonaismallien 
ennustavuuden lisäksi tutkielma testaa myös yksittäisten muuttujien tilastollista merkitsevyyttä. 
Tämän lisäksi tutkitaan kuinka ennustustarkkuus heikkenee, kun aikajänne konkurssista pitenee 
yhdestä kvartaalista kolmeen vuoteen. 
 
Tutkimuksessa perehdytään myös konkurssimallien ja pankkikriisien kehitykseen ja historiaan, 
minkä pohjalta luodaan malli empiiriseen analyysiin. Huomataan, että useat konkurssimallit 
sisältävät tunnuslukuaineistoa. Lisäksi aiempien merkittävien Yhdysvaltain pankkikriisien 
tutkimisella saadaan selville pankkitoiminnan kannalta perinteisten tekijöiden kuten likviditeetin, 
luottoriskin ja pankin kannattavuuden heijastuvan yksittäisten pankkien konkursseihin. Myös niin 
sanottuun subprime-kriisiin liittyvien arvopaperisijoitusten merkitsevyyttä viimeisimpiin 
pankkikonkursseihin tarkastellaan empiirisessä analyysissä.  
 
Tutkielman aineisto on koottu FDIC:n tietokannasta vuosien 2004 ja 2009 väliseltä ajalta, ja 
sisältää kaikkiaan 124 pääomaltaan yli 500 miljardin dollarin kokoista Yhdysvaltalaista liikepankkia 
(eng. commercial bank). Empiirisessä analyysissä todetaan 25 selittävän muuttujan olevan 
tilastollisesti merkitseviä pankkikonkurssien ennustamisessa. Toisaalta useat näistä tunnusluvuista 
ovat vahvasti korreloituneita keskenään, mistä syystä kaikkia merkitseviä tunnuslukuja ei voida 
sisällyttää samaan malliin. Näin ollen saadaan luotua kaikkiaan 72 erilaista mallia, joiden 
tarkkuutta pankkien konkurssiennustuksessa tutkitaan logistisen regression avulla. Lyhyen ja 
pitkän aikavälin analyysit osoittavat mallin, jossa selittävinä muuttujina ovat korkoa 
kerryttämättömät lainat, lainan diversifikaatio, oman pääoman tuotto, oman pääoman kasvu, 
verorasite, CMO suhdeluku, vakuuttamattomat talletukset, riskittömät sijoitukset, osinkoaste, 
lainojen kasvu, pääoman vaihtelu ja likvidi pääoma ennustavan parhaiten konkursseja. 
Ennustustarkkuutta mitataan oikein ennustettujen pankkien luumäärällä suhteessa otoksen 
kokoon (CC, eng. correctly classified). Kyseinen malli pystyy ennustamaan pankkikonkurssit 
oikein 95.16% tapauksista neljä kuukautta ennen tapahtumaa. Vastaava CC-luku on 82.26% 
vuosi, 72.58% kaksi vuotta ja 71.77% kolme vuotta ennen konkurssia.  
 
Tarkempi analyysi kuitenkin paljastaa, että vain kaksi selittävää muuttujaa, korkoa 
kerryttämättömät lainat ja riskittömät sijoitukset, ovat tilastollisesti merkitseviä ja johdonmukaisia 
pitkällä aikavälillä. Vaikka kahden muuttujan malli menettääkin jonkin verran ennustustarkkuutta, 
antaa se mahdollisuuden tarkempaan analyysiin kyseisten selittävien muuttujien kohdalla. 
Huomataan, että vain yhden prosenttiyksikön kasvu korkoa kerryttämättömissä lainoissa 
kasvattaa konkurssin todennäköisyyttä useita kymmeniä prosentteja. Toisaalta mitä suurempi osa 
sijoituksista on sidottu riskittömiin kohteisiin, sitä epätodennäköisemmältä konkurssi vaikuttaa. 
Analyysi osoittaa myös, että käytetty logit malli ennustaa hieman paremmin pankkikonkursseja 
kuin vastaava probit malli. 
 
Avainsanat: Konkurssiennustaminen, pankkikonkurssi, logistinen regression, tunnuslukuanalyysi. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
 
The year 2008 will be remembered as one the most shocking in the U.S. financial sector history. 
After many solid years of growth, banks started to fail with increasing speed. There were no 
commercial bank failures in 2005 or 2006 and only three during 2007. However, in 2008 already 
25 financial institutions failed giving foretaste for the 142 bankruptcies in year 2009. One of the 
most alarming sign was the failure of Washington Mutual Bank, together with its subsidiary 
Washington Mutual Bank FSB, having assets worth over 300 billion dollars at the time of failure. 
(FDIC, 2009) Indeed, not only did the number of commercial bank failures dramatically increase 
in 2008, but also the actual value of bankruptcies. 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Commercial Bank Failures from 2000 through 2009 
 
Source: FDIC 
 
The commercial banks were not the only ones to suffer, as also many investment banks and 
insurance companies failed or fell into troubles. For example, Bear Stearns, being one of the most 
prestigious investment banks, crashed in March 2008 and was acquired by J.P. Morgan (Landon, 
2008). Additionally, another famous investment bank, Lehman Brothers, filed for bankruptcy 
protection in September 2008. To give perspective to the incident, the failure of Lehman 
Brothers acts as the largest corporate failure in the entire history of U.S. bankruptcy court 
(Tkaczyk, 2009).  
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One will never know how many bankruptcies there would have been without U.S. government 
interventions. Certainly, the U.S. government has bought out significant amounts of so called 
toxic assets, mainly subprime related securities, in order to support financial sector and avoid 
total financial crash. The bailout of American International Group (AIG), worth of 85 billion 
dollars, is considered as the most notable one. The bailout happened only two weeks after the 
Treasury took over the federally chartered mortgage finance companies Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac), being government’s the most radical intervention to private business in the U.S. history. 
(Andrews,  de  la  Merced,  &  Williams  Walsh,  2008).  Thus  it  goes  without  saying  that  2008  was  
indeed one of the worst years in the history of U.S. financial sector. 
 
On contrary to the baffled reactions, the financial crisis came as no surprise. As banks’ balance 
sheets are loaded with debt, the banking system itself can be considered as highly volatile. Debt 
levels are generally stretched to risky limits as banks attempt to remain in competitive business. 
Naturally, intensive risk taking can debase banks’ ability to defend itself against negative shocks 
and surprises. In addition, banks are closely tied together through interbank lending, which tends 
to reflect insolvent banks’ problems to solvent ones. Once the domino effect is on, the financial 
crisis is inevitable. Therefore, it is crucial to notice the early signs of potential bank failures. 
 
Additionally, it needs to be noted that the assets and deposits lost in bank failures are not only 
the money people have lost in crises, but also the value of houses have crashed, consumer credit 
defaults increased, the bond issuers downgraded, value of commercial property diminished, and 
corporate  defaults  exploded  (Wolf,  2008).  Consequently,  the  crises  extend  to  real  economy,  
which makes the banking problems even more severe than it might seem at the first glance. 
 
The current crisis is nothing unforeseen as there has been two rather similar periods in U.S. 
financial history. The first wave of bank failures happened during the Great Depression in the 
1930s and the second during Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis in the 1980-90s. Although, the study 
at hand concentrates on the determinants behind the latest commercial bank failures, the history 
of U.S. banking difficulties will be briefly covered in order to enlighten the common factors 
behind the three financial crisis and individual bank failures. 
 
In academic discussion, three main topics relating to the banking sector difficulties can be found: 
currency crisis prediction, banking panic forecasting, and individual institutions failure mapping. 
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In this study the focus is on individual commercial bank failure prediction as it can be argued that 
the number of financial institution bankruptcies is strongly related to depth of the overall crisis. 
Therefore, by minimizing the number of bankruptcies on the financial sector, the severity of the 
crisis can be reduced. Naturally, banks tend to fail when overall economic condition deteriorates. 
Nevertheless,  here  the  focus  will  be  on  detecting  the  troubled  banks  early  on,  so  that  systemic  
risk and contagion could be minimized and finally potential crisis avoided.  
 
The main objective for the research is to find the most accurate model for bankruptcy prediction. 
Academics worldwide have invented numerous models and methodologies for bankruptcy 
forecasting. Logistic regression, in other words logit model, seems to be commonly accepted tool 
for bank failure prediction due to its accuracy and easiness to use. The logit model is therefore 
applied also in this study in order to reliable predict the possible bankruptcies.  
 
Thus, the focus will be on commercial bank failures, more accurately on FDIC covered 
institutions. Since the data related to subprime mortgage instruments and the overall exposures of 
the banks are virtually impossible to gather, the concentration is on bank-specific variables, in 
other words, in different financial ratios. Therefore, systemic risk, contagion, and interbank 
lending will not be covered in the analysis. Previous studies indicate that at least capital ratio as 
well as nonperforming loans to assets will forecast bankruptcies as early as one or two years prior 
the actual failure. Hence they will be analyzed also in this study alongside with new independent 
variables relating to the subprime loans and securities that are relatively new instruments in the 
lending market. Although, the overall subprime exposure is not possible to detect, proxies of 
how much assets banks are tied to subprime securities, such as MBS to total securities, can be 
provided. By combining traditional independent variables with modern ones, the prediction 
accuracy can be improved and more suitable bank failure forecasting model can be generated. 
 
The thesis consists of five sections. After the introduction, an overview of the existing literature 
concerning the bank failure predicting is covered. Here also the key concepts of the study and the 
main elements behind the bank failures will be provided. The literature overview focuses on the 
Great Depression, U.S. banking crisis from 1980s through the 1990s, and the subprime crisis. 
The issues around the banking failures are emphasized, while the real economy problems will be 
left uncovered. Finally, also the failure predicting models are illuminated in the end of the section. 
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In the third section the methodology and data of the study are presented. As mentioned, the 
logistic regression method is used in this thesis. Thus, the background and function of the model 
is explained alongside with the reasoning behind selecting the method. Additionally, the data of 
the study and the reasoning for choosing the particular financial ratios are covered at the end of 
the third section. 
 
Section four provides the empirical analysis and the results of the study. As the main purpose of 
the thesis is to test whether some of the financial ratios predict the bank failures, the procedure 
of  choosing  specific  variables  in  the  final  predicting  model  and  the  accuracy  of  the  model  are  
carefully presented.  Finally, in section five, the study is summarized and concluding remarks are 
provided. 
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2 LITERATURESURVEYOFBANKRUPTCYPREDICTION
 
In this section different elements relating to bankruptcy prediction are presented. In the 
beginning, the key concepts are explained in order to grasp a clear view of the bankruptcy 
phenomenon. Thereafter, the different parameters relating to bankruptcy prediction are 
illustrated. Then the glance of the U.S. bank failure history is presented. The focus is on the 
factors  behind  the  earlier  bank  failures  and  the  joint  features  between  previous  and  current  
bankruptcies. Finally, in the last part of the section, different failure prediction models, in other 
words early warning systems (EWSs), are illustrated.  
 
 
2.1 KeyConcepts
 
Banks, like any other firms, try to maximize shareholders value by generating earnings that exceed 
expenses. There are, however, some factors that differentiate banks from regular companies. 
When adopting the traditional view towards commercial banking, banks are seen as fixed-value 
deposit takers. Deposits are the banks’ principal liability and can be withdrawn at very short 
notice. Banks lend long-term money to different parties such as industrial companies, individual 
consumers, or even other banks. Loans, therefore, can be seen as banks’ principal assets. When 
law of large numbers applies, only small portion of assets needs to be held in liquid reserves to 
meet  deposit  withdrawals.  However,  here  lies  a  liquidity  problem  if  for  one  reason  or  other  
exceptionally high withdrawals occur. This certainly is a valid risk although banks might be 
mainly in good condition. Therefore, one can argue that the health of a bank not only depends 
on its success in picking profitable investment projects for lending but also on the confidence of 
depositors in the value of the loan book and in their confidence that other depositors will not run 
the bank. To sum up, the key elements of bank problems are mainly dependent of loan 
characters, liquidity, the quality of borrowers and investments, and exogenous shocks. 
 
EWSs are predicting tools for individual bank failures or for detecting the financial distress of a 
complete banking system. As already stated, the focus here is on individual bank failure 
prediction, not on discovering the distress level or depth of the whole banking sector. Therefore, 
every time EWS is referred, financial institution failure forecasting is indicated. When a bank 
faces problems, it either falls or stays on market. Thus, bankruptcy is defined as a binary event in 
contrast to the index of banking system distress that can take a continuum of values. 
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The definition of bank failure is obviously one of the most crucial definitions in the thesis. 
Financial institution is categorized as failed if it has fallen either into Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 in 
U.S. bankruptcy code. Chapter 7 means straight bankruptcy, or in other words liquidation, where 
the bank would not be operating anymore. Chapter 11, also called rehabilitation bankruptcy, is 
much more complicated than chapter 7 as it allows a firm, or in this case a bank, the opportunity 
to reorganize its debt and try to re-emerge as a healthy organization. (Bankruptcy Basics, 2009) 
 
The bankruptcy models or EWSs can be divided into two categories: on-site and off-site 
assessments. On-site assessment is done in the premises of a bank, by examining bookkeeping 
records, business books, subsidiary ledgers, and other records and accounts in order to evaluate 
bank’s financial soundness and compliance with laws and regulatory policies. The aim here is also 
to assess the quality of its management and to evaluate the systems of internal control. Off-site 
analysis, on the other hand, can be made by using publicly available information only. That 
information includes annual and quarterly reports that banks are obligated to compile to the 
regulators. Although on-site assessment is inclusive and precise, off-site analysis takes less effort 
and can be done frequently, which makes its valuable tool for regulators. Cole and Gunther 
(1998) even argue that off-site examination can be more accurate than on-site assessment. Those 
positive aspects of the off-site examination with the difficulty to visit numerous banks in the U.S. 
make the decision to focus on off-site models quite obvious. Therefore, the models used in the 
analysis will contain only financial statement figures. 
 
Although this study is not about the subprime crisis, the subprime related loan instruments can 
be considered as having an impact on bank failures. As mentioned already, subprime is relatively 
new loan instrument having developed under the blessing of Bush administration, and being 
targeted to low-income consumers that do not fulfill the criteria for prime loans. Moreover, 
subprime  mortgages  were  packed  together  to  form  mortgage-backed  securities  that  were  then  
sold to investors and other banks. Thus, financial institutions were not only buying and selling 
securities,  but  also  guaranteed  them.  This  complex  structure  of  subprime  loans  makes  it  very  
difficult to detect what is the total subprime exposure of a specific bank, but it is commonly 
agreed that subprime securities were one of the main reasons behind the current banking 
problems. Hence, also subprime loans are discussed in more detailed in the upcoming sections. 
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2.2 ElementsofanEarlyWarningSystemsandBankFailures
 
Now  that  definitions  are  covered  it  is  time  to  turn  the  attention  to  the  elements  used  in  
constructing early warning systems. Thereby, the focus is on creating a model that predicts 
individual bank failures. The choice of explanatory variables for the bank failures is guided by 
economic theory, more accurately, by the recognized sources of financial fragility arising from the 
banking industry. Next the main fragility factors are listed. 
 
Liquidity. Banks are suppliers of liquidity, since they transfer illiquid assets into 
liquid liabilities. This function naturally makes banks vulnerable to liquidity crises, 
and hence the set of explanatory variables needs to include measurement of 
liquidity risk. Examples of liquidity risk ratios are total security holdings to total 
assets and valuable time deposits to total time deposits. 
 
Credit risk. Banks’ customers have diverse backgrounds and thus can be seen as 
unequal debtors. Fortunately, banks can pool the risk of different investment 
projects. Nevertheless, this does not erase the problem of credit risk. Indeed, 
variables that proxy the credit risk must be included to the analysis. Such ratios are, 
for example, total loans and leases to total assets and assets in nonaccrual status to 
total assets. 
 
Profitability and taxes. Banks, as many other companies, cannot stay in business 
unless they make profits. Therefore, ratios including profitability need to be added 
into  the  model.  Classical  ratios  such  as  return  on  assets  and  return  on  equity  are  
good proxies for profitability as well as cash dividends to total assets. It is also 
notable that solvent banks tend to pay higher taxes than banks facing severe 
profitability problems. Thus, applicable income taxes to total assets ratio should be 
included to the analysis. 
 
Size and growth. If the financial institution is sizeable and growing fast, the 
probability of the bank failure decreases. Therefore, figures such as total assets and 
change in total equity from previous year to current year cannot be ignored. 
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Loan mix. It is also crucial to study whether the type of a loan matters. In other 
words, it is important to examine if the real estate lenders have higher probability 
to fail than banks lending for example to businesses. Furthermore, the liquidity of 
the loan portfolio might include vital information. For example, ratio of time 
deposits to total deposits should be included to the analysis. 
 
Securities. Although the business idea of a bank is to buy and sell assets, it still 
invests  to  securities  at  some  level.  As  mentioned,  the  banks’  total  exposure  to  
subprime related instruments is hard to detect, but the picture of riskiness of banks’ 
investment portfolio can be studied by dividing the portfolio into pieces and 
analyzing the nature of failure banks’ investments. Ratios such as mortgage-backed 
securities to total securities and collateralized mortgage obligations to total 
securities should therefore be included to the analysis.  
 
Instability. A bank close to failure can be expected to have some degree of volatility 
in its financial performance. As sudden changes in amounts of assets or equity 
prior the collapse of a bank can be seen as a proxy of failure variables, instability 
parameters must be added into the analysis. Total assets to mean of total assets and 
equity to mean of equity are example of ratios worth of closer look. 
 
Elements presented here are only ceilings to the specific  data used in the study.  Ratios that  are 
crucial for the analysis will be explained more carefully in the data section.  
 
 
2.3 BackgroundoftheU.S.BankFailures
 
The history overview of the U.S. banking starts from the foundation of Federal Reserve System 
(FED) in 1913. FED was founded as an attempt to bring stability to financial markets after the 
Panic of 1907 exposed weakness of an uncontrolled system (FDIC, 2006). It is vital to 
understand the lessons learnt from the Great Depression and the S&L crisis as they reveal crucial 
issues behind a bank operating logic. By studying the history of banking problems, it is possible 
to predict the critical factors behind the future financial institutions bankruptcies. The regulatory 
details will not be discussed in detail as only the main regulatory development behind the recent 
bank failures will be clarified.  
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2.3.1 TheEraoftheGreatDepression
 
In the era of 1929-33 U.S. financial system experienced very difficult and chaotic period. 
Numerous bank failures culminated to the shutdown of the entire banking system in March 1933 
(Bernanke, 1983). As Bernanke (1983) points out there were two main reasons behind the 
financial collapse in the 1930s: the loss of confidence in financial institutions, mainly commercial 
banks, being the one, and the widespread insolvency of debtors being the second. As topic of this 
paper is in bank failure prediction, both of the elements are considered relevant. 
 
The failures of financial institutions were substantial during the Great Depression. Many different 
financial institutions were swept away, but commercial banks were the ones to take the heaviest 
hit. The percentage of operating banks that failed in each year from 1930 to 1933 was 5.6, 10.5, 
7.8 and 12.9, respectively. Due to the failures and also mergers in banking industry, the number 
of  operating  banks  at  the  end  of  1933  was  a  little  bit  above  half  of  the  number  that  existed  in  
1929. Also those banks that survived faced severe losses during the depression. (Bernanke, 1983) 
 
There are several reasons behind the bank failures in the 1930s. One explanation is the 
substantial number of small banks in the U.S. at the time with low capacity to recover from any 
kind of shock. One can even argue that some of the bank failures where desirable and were due 
to ‘natural causes’, as the legal barriers to entry in banking were very low compared to the other 
big western countries such as Canada, U.K., and France. However, not all the failures were 
‘natural’ as panic in financial markets explains great amount of the failures. When bank’s 
customers are withdrawing their assets nearly simultaneously, the bank quickly needs to sell its 
illiquid  assets  or  even  dump part  of  them in  order  to  survive.  Other  investors  soon realize  the  
problem causing bank panic, where substantial amount of people are withdrawing their funds 
simultaneously. This is driving otherwise solvent banks into troubles. In the end, this will lead to 
a situation, where solvent banks fail mainly because of illiquidity of their assets and the panic in 
the market. (Bernanke, 1983) Therefore, the expectation of failure, by the mechanism of the run, 
tends to become self-conforming. The phenomenon is also referred as a sunspot (Cass & Shell, 
1983). 
 
As Bernanke (1983) states, another reason causing financial crisis was the insolvency of debtors. 
During the Great Depression deflation made the loan payback burden unbearable as the loan 
contract where written in nominal terms. Especially households, small companies, and farmers 
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faced severe problems due to deflated food prices. Thus, borrowers were unable to meet their 
payment obligations causing major problems to already struggling commercial banks. 
 
In addition to Bernanke’s (1983) explanation, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have their own 
explanation to the issue. According to them the first banking crisis after October 1930 might be a 
consequence from poor loans and investments made in the twenties. During that time the quality 
of loans granted was not high enough and substantial amount of risk was taken. Also the level of 
bank reserve requirements was low allowing banks to grand loans to poorer and less solvent 
customers. (ibid.) Consequently, the original sin in the 1920s and 1930s seems to be the same 
than what it was in the 2000s: lack of liquid assets, low bank reserves, and considerable amounts 
of risky lending. Therefore, liquidity, credit risk, and loan mix are important variables to include 
to the empirical analysis of the thesis. 
 
 2.3.2 TheBankingSystemProblemsfrom1980stoearly1990s
 
After the Great Depression the banking industry in the U.S. grew steadily many decades without 
significant problems. However, the ‘problem free era’ ended in the 1980s, when banks started to 
fail with increasing speed. During the 1980s and early 1990s more than 1,600 commercial or 
savings banks insured by the FDIC failed. The peak was in years 1987 and 1989, and overall 
failing rate reached the level of nine percent measured both in total number and total assets of 
banks  compared  to  the  figures  in  the  end  of  1979  including  all  the  banks  founded  during  the  
subsequent 15 years. (FDIC, 1997) Although there was an unquestionable costly problem in the 
U.S. banking industry, the episode did not necessarily fulfill all the components of a crisis at least 
when compared to the episode of the Great Depression. 
 
The special feature of the S&L crisis was the concentration of the bank failures on a few states. 
The most affected states were Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and California. In addition, bank failures seemed to occur in different periods. 
(González-Hermosillo, 1999) For the purpose of this study these problem regions are divided 
into three sub areas, the Southwest, the Northeast, and California, in order to provide more 
precise explanation of the specific problems related to the episode. 
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The substantial part of the bank failures in the Southwest (Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana) 
occurred during 1986-92, peaking in 1988-89. The main reason behind the banking problems was 
the significant drop in oil price after 1981, and its final collapse in 1986, giving a severe shock for 
the energy-producing Southwest states. As a result of the bloom of energy market in the 1970s, 
also the real estate prices had ballooned. Therefore, as oil prices began to fall, the real estate 
markets  started  to  struggle  as  well  leaving  damaged  banks  behind.  Moreover,  the  weak  
agricultural price level toughened the situation deepening the banking problems. (González-
Hermosillo, 1999) 
 
However,  not  all  the  banks  failed  during  the  energy  price  crisis.  Interestingly,  the  main  sorting  
factor between surviving and failing banks was the level of commercial and industrial loans 
relative to the total loans. Banks with more aggressive business loan ratio took the hardest hit, 
since a large part of the industry loans belonged to energy companies that were struggling, and a 
substantial portion of commercial loans belonged to real estate sector both facing major 
problems. (FDIC, 1997) As a conclusion, it can be argued that a severe exogenous shock was the 
starting point of the banking problems in the Southwest. 
 
If the exogenous shocks caused the problems in the Southwest, the Northeast suffered mainly 
due to fall of the real estate markets that boomed during the 1980s. The most of the bank failures 
happened during 1991-92, just after the end of the cold war due to decline in computer industry 
that was heavily concentrated to New England. Again the banks with high level of commercial 
and industrial loans relative to total loans suffered more severe losses than the banks with more 
conservative loan ratio. (González-Hermosillo, 1999) California had similar problems than the 
Northeast, but in addition it was also a major recipient of Japanese investments. Therefore, the 
recession in Japan in the 1990s was strongly reflected to the financial sector of California in years 
1992 and 1993. (González-Hermosillo, 1999) 
 
Although many banks in the U.S. failed after 1985, the actual cause originated from 1960s. As 
mentioned, couple of severe macroeconomic shocks had a huge impact on banks, but one of the 
common factors behind the problems was the deregulation of the banking sector from 1960s 
through the 1980s. For example, in 1967 state of Texas approved major liberalization of so called 
savings and loan association or thrift powers. Since then, the property development loans were 
allowed up to 50% of the net value. This was only a starting point of series of new regulations. 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) enacted in March 
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1980 and Garn - St Germain Depository Institutions Act in December 1982. Those acts basically 
increased the size and diversity of loans granted. In addition, in September 1981 Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board permitted troubled thrifts to issue so called income capital certificates that were 
purchased by Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). (FDIC, 2002) The 
granted certificates made insolvent institutions look virtually solvent and actually deleted the 
downside risk of borrowers’ possible failures.  
 
As a consequence of the deregulation, S&L institutions faced though competition in lending 
markets aggravating banks opportunity for profit making. Therefore, banks realized an 
opportunity for notable profit margins when junk-bond market started to blossom in the 1980s. 
Many S&L institutions invested in junk bonds, which led into troubles when house and oil prices 
started  to  fall.  In  1991  The  Financial  Reform,  Recovery,  and  Enforcement  Act  (FIRREA)  
contributed to the problems in the junk-bond market to some extent. The main function of 
FIRREA was to reverse part of the deregulation made earlier in the 1980s. Thrifts were now 
denied to invest in junk-bonds, and a minimum of 70 percent of thrifts’ assets were required to 
hold in residential mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Additionally, one major objective 
of the act was the bailout of insolvent institutions. (Wolfson, 1986) 
 
Finally, in the beginning of the 1990s, the interest rates declined causing sharply upward-sloping 
yield curve that improved the value of bank security portfolios and raised net interest margins on 
new loans, diminishing the number of bank failures. (FDIC, 1997) As a summary, it can be 
argued that deregulation with macroeconomic shock is an unsettling combination and might 
conclude severe problems to banking industry if banks lack cushion and conservative loan ratios 
and are investing heavily on risky assets. Thus liquidity, credit risk, and loan mix are the factors 
that should be covered in the upcoming empirical analysis. 
 
 2.3.3 TheSubprimeCrisis
 
The  year  2008  was  one  of  the  darkest  years  in  the  history  of  U.S.  banking.  One  of  the  most  
shocking incidents was the failure of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008 revealing the 
seriousness and depth of the current crisis (Epiq, 2009). As a consequence, FED injected 
substantial amounts of money into the banks to keep the other financial institutions alive. 
Suddenly people were talking about a new depression. But what were the actual reasons behind 
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the crisis and, more precisely, bank failures? Why it all happened such a storming pace and 
depth? This chapter provides an answer to these questions. 
 
 
2.3.3.1 HousingMarketBoom
 
Kiff and Mills (2007) argue that one of the main initial factors behind the crisis was the increasing 
inflation in housing market that made a house purchase exceptionally expensive in the 2000s. 
Due to inflated real estate prices consumers were forced to apply sizeable mortgages. Kiff and 
Mills (2007) continue that people that normally had not afforded to own a house were now able 
to buy one as they were offered subprime mortgages, a household loans targeted to individuals 
that do not fulfill the criteria of prime loans. The assessment of the subprime borrower is usually 
done by using three different standards: borrower’s statistically calculated credit score or so called 
FICO score, debt service-to-income (DTI) ratio, and the mortgage loan-to-value (LTV). DTI is 
defined as the percentage of a consumer's monthly gross income that goes toward paying debts. 
LTV, on the other hand, expresses the amount of a first mortgage lien as a percentage of the total 
appraised value of real property. Normally, borrowers with low FICO scores, below 620, DTIs 
above  55%,  and/or  LTVs  over  85%  are  likely  to  be  considered  subprime  (Foote,  Gerardi,  
Goette, & Willen, 2008 and Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2008).  
 
There were also loans falling in between prime and subprime loans. So called Alt-A loans were 
borrowed by the consumers that usually covered all the criteria mentioned, but failed to provide 
complete income documentation. (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2008). Kregel (2008) illuminates 
that Alt-A and subprime loans cover relatively small part of the total population of mortgages as 
they are rather new instruments in financial market. 
 
The procedure for sorting potential borrowers has changed dramatically. Approximately a decade 
ago banks were still institutions that made risk assessments based on individual track record and 
trust. Now, however, this task has been transferred to rating companies such as Fair Isaac. What 
they do is they basically convert a person into numbers and employ algorithms to create 
individual’s  risk  level.  (Kregel,  2008)  This,  of  course,  has  increased  efficiency  but  has  also  had  
major downturn, namely the undervalued risks. The level of risk culminated in subprime and Alt-
A loans, which were not guaranteed by a government sponsored entity such as Fannie Mae or 
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Freddy Mac. Therefore, banks that were lending subprime loans or investing in subprime 
securities were carrying the full credit risk. 
 
Subprime mortgages in general have higher interest rates than prime loans, but the loan terms are 
easier to meet. This can be seen as one of the main reasons for 5% increase in homeownership 
rate from 1995 to 2005 as poor people were granted mortgages. There have also been speculators 
obtaining loans on the basis of expected collateral appreciation. Naturally, increased 
homeownership rate combined with opportunistic behavior pushed the real estate prices to 
higher level and therefore forced banks to lend larger mortgages, to enable Americans to buy a 
decent size home. (Kiff & Mills, 2007) Mortgage tax deductions can also be seen as one incentive 
increasing oversized real estate loans as it has made it possible to use part of the mortgage for 
personal consumption (Klyuev & Mills, 2007). 
 
Due to the booming house prices mortgage lenders ended up in difficulties as they were unable 
to find borrowers to meet the conforming loan terms such as DTIs and LTVs although the 
FICO score requirements were met. Therefore, increasing amount of borrowers fell into Alt-A or 
subprime class. (Kiff & Mills, 2007) The market share of the subprime mortgages basically 
exploded between 2001 and 2006 from around 8 percent to 20 percent, and securitized share of 
the subprime mortgage market grew from 54 to 75 percent. Especially, the high-LTV borrowers 
became increasingly risky compared to the low-LTV borrowers. This also showed in the interest 
rates paid by the households as the above-average LTV borrower’s premium compared to an 
average LTV borrower grew from 10 basis points to 30 basis points. In many respects the 
subprime market experienced a classic boom-bust scenario with rapid market growth, loosening 
underwriting standards, and worsening loan performance. This all was disguised by the raising 
house  prices.  (Demyanyk  &  Van  Hemert,  2008)  Thus,  in  the  analysis  part  also  the  impact  of  
increased mortgage risk is covered by studying, for example, the ratio of total real estate loans to 
total loans.  
 
Furthermore, the loan granting procedure in banks were rather loose couple of years ago as so 
called ninjas (no income, no job, and no assets) grew heavily during 2000-06. This was also the 
period when brokers received huge upfront paid commissions from each new loan. It has been 
an  effective  way  not  only  to  swell  brokers’  salary  but  also  to  increase  banks’  risk  levels  due  to  
reckless loan granting. (Blackburn, 2008) The reason behind the loose loan granting system has 
been so called ‘ownership society’ envisioned by the Bush administration. As the press release of 
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the White House reveals President Bush believed that “homeownership benefits individual 
families by building stability and long-term financial security” (The White House, 2004). 
Although being a noble goal, it was not very realistic as also the people unable to pay mortgage 
got one. As we understand it now this kind of system cannot live forever, and after a couple of 
years with teaser rate mortgages interest rates in house loans skyrocketed at the same time with 
falling house prices leaving many distressed home owners no other option than default as 
prepayment and refinancing options were not realistic with little or no housing equity. 
(Blackburn, 2008) Foote et al. (2008) share the same view and stress that there are clear causality 
between falling real estate prices and subprime borrowers foreclosures. The dramatic fall of the 
house prices is  illustrated in the Figure 2 below. As the main question of this  study is  how the 
inflated loan exposure effected on bank failures, the explanatory variables answering the question 
need to be added into the data set.  
 
Figure 2. FHFA House Price Index History for U.S. 
 
Source. Russell & Mullin, 2009 
 
The base for the crisis was built between 2001 and 2005, when interest rate levels were at the low 
level. During that period U.S. increased its debt burden enormously especially in the households 
and financial sector. Such a low interest rates and loose monetary policy can be explained by soft 
landing from the share bubble and national security after the 9/11 attacks, since U.S. wanted to 
show its economic power by increasing purchasing power of its citizens (Blackburn, 2008). 
Americans consumed with debt while banks and regulators encouraged for that. Figure 3 and 4 
exhibit the interest rate movements and increased debt burden. 
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Figure 3. Market yield on U.S. Treasury securities 
 
Source: The Federal Reserve Board 
 
Figure 4. Seasonally Adjusted Debt Growth 
 
Source: The Federal Reserve Board 
 
There were also illegal speculators with appétit for quick profits who supplied poison assets to 
the market by using so called predatory lending where borrowers were deceived to take an unfair 
loan. Usually some teaser rate was included to the deal as bait and when the originator granted 
the loan it was almost simultaneously repacked and sold to the investors as securities. Predatory 
lending  is  naturally  against  the  law,  but  it  took  a  while  before  authorities  realized  the  problem  
whilst the damage was already done. (Blackburn, 2008) 
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As  Blackburn  (2008)  stresses  teaser  rates  and  predatory  lending  seem  to  have  a  crucial  role  in  
subprime mortgage crisis. However, as Foote et al. (2008) point out that might not be the case. 
They show that the so called teaser rate was actually rather high around 8 percent and was well 
above 1-year prime ARM rate. Therefore, it can be argued that the teaser rate was not the issue 
behind the subprime crisis, although existing during that time. Also the dramatic increase in 
interest rate levels after two or three-year period is misleading according to Foote et al. (2008). 
They stress that the usual way of defining interest rate after the initial period was to use 6-month 
LIBOR as a base rate and then add around 6 percentage points’ margin on the top of it. For 
example, when in 2006 the 6-month LIBOR was around 5% and the margin was 6 percentage 
points, the mortgage rate set up at the level of 11 %. Indeed, three-percentage point increase to 
the high initial rate is hardly explosive growth as some authors state it. 
 
Increasing defaults among U.S. subprime mortgage holders in the last quarter of 2006 and early 
2007 can be seen as the trigger for the credit crunch. It is crucial to notice that it is not only poor 
individuals with bad credit history that took too much loan. On contrary, foreclosure figures state 
that subprime borrowers covered only minor part of the defaults as in the U.S. prime loan 
borrowers were responsible at the majority of the foreclosures. (Foote, Gerardi, Goette, & 
Willen, 2008) At the time of the foreclosures, interest rates climbed to protect the falling dollar. 
As the first signs of the crisis were revealed the world’s central banks tried to pump huge 
amounts of liquidity into the global financial system. The impact was, however, temporary and 
the banks remained unwilling to lend to another. Again, liquidity seems to be related to the failure 
of financial institutions with the already mentioned credit risk variables. Therefore, it is obvious 
that liquidity should be one of the factors under the study of the thesis. 
 
 
2.3.3.2 MortgageSecuritization
 
Second major factor behind the current financial crisis according to Kiff and Mills (2007) is the 
increased demand of so called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In the eyes of investors these 
securities appeared as relatively low risk trading instruments with high-expected rate of return. In 
MBSs mortgages were combined together and then sold to investor mainly during 2005-06. High 
demand was a good incentive for lenders to sell as much loans as possible, since the risk taker in 
the case of default was the MBS guarantor. This is possible when financial institutions are both 
investing  and  guarantying  MBSs.  This  was  done  in  order  to  limit  informational  asymmetry  and  
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create faith among investors. In addition, issuing banks felt that MBSs and other backed 
securities had desired risk-return and diversification profile. Therefore, when the depositors 
started to default, banks started to make huge write downs when realizing they had quite a bit of 
‘trash’ in their balance sheets. (Gibson, 2004) The subprime crisis generated write-downs and 
credit losses worth of approximately 1.5 trillion dollars during 2008-09. (Tan, 2009) 
 
Also the former Vice President of Lehman Brothers bank, Larry McDonald, stated in the BBC’s 
HARDtalk  (2009)  that  Lehman  Brothers’  biggest  mistake  was  to  go  into  the  risky  ‘storage’  
business instead of staying purely at trading business. The bank now tied huge amounts of money 
in mortgage related securities instead of doing its core business by taking fees from trading 
transactions. McDonald continues that the reason why Lehman Brothers was able to avoid 
failures in the past was its pure concentration on being a financial broker. The same applies with 
commercial banks, which main business is to lend and borrow money. One may argue that the 
sin of tying assets into the risky securities deteriorated banks situation so that failures occurred. 
 
The securitization was usually made by so called special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose 
entity (SPE). The reason of creating such a stand-alone entity was banks’ need to transfer loans 
and the credit risk related to them from their balance sheets to the SPV, which is a legally 
independent financial institution that issues its own liabilities in order to acquire the assets 
originated by the bank. However, the liabilities that were sold to the institutional investors needed 
to carry an investment-grade rating from a nationally recognized rating organization. (Kregel, 
2008) As the reputation of prestigious originating banks helped to create thrust among rating 
companies,  MBSs  carried  risk  rating  that  seemed  low  and  reliable  to  the  investors.  As  can  be  
imagined, the shock was significant when investors realized that the risk was estimated terribly 
wrong. 
 
As mentioned, SPVs absorbed different kinds of assets. These assets have been ranked so that 
Level 1 assets could be valued in stock and included liquid types of securities. The value of Level 
2 assets were based on a model, which relate them to an index or similar traded assets. The Level 
3 values of assets could be determined by using different kinds of mathematical and theoretical 
models with no directly traded element. Naturally, Level 3 assets were the most illiquid ones and 
hardest to price accurately. It is important to note these levels as the level structure plays an 
important role, since a SPV needs to set a market price to its assets from time to time, in other 
words mark to market. As most of the MBSs fell from Level 2 to Level 3 in 2007 many financial 
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entities ended up having plenty of gravely priced Level 3 assets in their possession, creating an 
enormous possibility for a valuation error. (Blackburn, 2008) This naturally made the situation of 
the SPVs rather difficult for the banks and investors, since the level of risk increased dramatically 
when major part of the assets were more illiquid than earlier. As one can notice, the liquidity issue 
can be seen again quite crucial matter in the case of bank difficulties.  
 
Although only MBS have been presented until now, it is not the only security that includes 
subprime loans and mortgages. Asset-backed securities (ABSs) may also include subprime loans, 
although they do not include mortgages. On the other hand, collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO), or collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO), which includes different kinds of banks’ 
receivables  such  as  loans  and  mortgages  is  the  most  complex  instrument  even  including  assets  
that were backed twice. It is also important to notice that while creating for example CDOs 
different tranches were formed. The purpose of different mortgage and asset tranches was to 
build a pool of assets with different level of quality and risk. Generally, tranches were divided into 
three different classes: senior, mezzanine, and equity. Senior tranches had the highest quality and 
lowest expected rate of return and it was used as a base for MBSs and CDOs. Usually, securities 
included approximately 70 percent of senior assets. Since the senior tranches’ expected return 
was rather low compared to other tranches, mezzanine and equity tranches were developed to 
tempt investors. Second highest quality assets were mezzanine assets that offered higher expected 
return than senior tranches. Bottom of the chain were equity assets that in a case of default would 
lose its value first. Obviously, equity tranche offered also the highest expected return. (Blackburn, 
2008) 
 
One should notice that there were also so called single-tranche CDOs. In those securities only 
one tranche of the capital structure is sold to an investor. What it basically means is that issuers 
were  able  to  sell  only  tranches  that  faced  highest  demand.  Also  the  overall  demand  of  CDOs  
increased when single-tranche CDOs came out, since investors were able to buy only an 
instrument that they believed would serve their investment portfolio the best. (Gibson, 2004) 
One more reason why CDOs were offered with so relentlessly was the commission that the 
underwriters received (Blackburn, 2008). In other words banks made decent money just by 
repacking the loans. 
 
Gorton (2008) points out that the asymmetric information among different parties in loan 
markets had also notable impact on the subprime crisis. In other words, it is impossible to predict 
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for example future house prices while lending and borrowing mortgages. He stresses that house 
prices and mortgage performance information arrives with a lag, and thus they cannot trigger the 
crisis. Gorton (2008) claims that different kinds of ABSs were traded and priced with the issuers’ 
reputation  in  stake.  Therefore,  when  complex  securities  were  not  understood,  buyers  took  the  
risk rate and expected rate of return as given and blindly trusted the issuer’s prestige bank 
reputation. Moreover, he states that current crisis is after all caused by a banking panic. Although 
the structured securities and capital markets have been the eye-catcher this time, the fundamental 
base case is the short term liability holders’ refusal to fund banks due to the fear of losses, thus 
the logic is the same than in the earlier panics in the U.S. This time, nevertheless, the SPVs played 
a crucial role and eventually were the reason why liquidity of repo market dried up. 
 
As a conclusion one may argue that lending to risky subprime-individuals was reckless decision 
for many banks. Also loan ratios were not as conservative as they should have been in order to 
maintain solvency. Again roughly same mistakes were made than in the earlier crises creating the 
possibility to implement the traditional ex ante prediction tools for forecasting current bank 
failures with traditional financial ratio variables. Now, however, relatively new subprime mortgage 
related instruments should have the focus they deserved in the analysis. Therefore, some weight 
is also put on quality of mortgage lending and banks’ investments. 
 
 
2.4 FailurePredictionModels
 
After historical glance of the banking crises and elements related to them, the next step is to 
illustrate the evolution of bankruptcy prediction models. As stated earlier, bank failure models are 
divided into on-site and off-site models. On-site models include different kinds of applications of 
so called CAMEL analysis employed by several regulators. Off-site analysis is mainly done with 
help of statistical tools and financial statement information. In this chapter, the on-site models 
and other systems used by U.S. regulators are firstly covered and thereafter the mainly academic 
off-site models presented. 
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2.4.1 Regulators’models
 
The traditional approach to assess financial difficulties of individual banks is closely related to the 
work of supervisors of the banking system and rating agencies. The most knowing rating system 
is so called CAMEL the acronym for the criteria: capital adequacy, assets quality, management, 
earnings, and liquidity. The score of individual performance of an institution is compared to all 
other institutions, generating a bank-specific rating index. The original CAMEL system is the 
purest form of the on-site model. In 1997 the sixth component, sensitivity to market risk, has 
been added to the system and thus the model is currently called CAMLES (Lopez, 1999). Both 
CAMEL and CAMELS work the same way and include a rating for each individual component 
of a scale from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). The rating is based on broad and general on-site evaluation 
of both qualitative and quantitative information of the bank. From the individual component 
ratings the overall index is computed. The supervisor running the analysis weighs the ratings of 
different components into the composite index. Then the overall information gathered is used to 
decide if the specific action or tighter supervisory is needed. Normally, if bank’s index is less than 
two, the financial institution is considered to be a high-quality bank, whereas institutions with 
scores four or five are rated to be insolvent (Curry, Elmer, & Fissel, 2009).  
 
Although the rating systems such as CAMELS are effective measures of the current condition of 
banks, and therefore can be seen essential tools for banking supervisory, there has been an 
increasing debate about the limits of the approaches. CAMEL(S) models parallel the condition of 
the bank only the time of the examination, while variables in the systems are highly responsive to 
changes in the economic conditions and the bank performance. Moreover, the fact that the 
measurement is ex-post in nature does the reacting to the insolvency in time difficult. (Gaytán & 
Johnson, 2002) Nevertheless, CAMEL(S) systems are still rather popular among regulators.  
 
One way to predict bank failures is to use off-site data in order to estimate ratings that 
institutions gain from on-site examinations such as CAMELS. U.S. Federal Reserve’s System of 
Estimate  Examination  Ratings  (SEER)  is  one  example  of  that  kind  of  model  using  limited  
dependent regression techniques in order to determine the historical relationship between a set of 
variables. The SEER has an indicator function, which takes a value 1 if the dependent variable 
belongs  to  a  predetermined  interval  and  zero  otherwise.  Variables  in  the  SEER are  proxies  for  
credit  risk,  leverage  risk,  and  liquidity  risk.  The  results  given  by  SEER  are  used  for  a  periodic  
estimation of ratings. Although the current estimation mainly reflects the present condition of the 
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bank, the history of the analysis performance can show any deterioration in the condition of the 
institution.  Moreover,  the  model  can  create  an  ex-ante  indicator  of  insolvency,  since  it  allows  
estimating the probability of rating downgrade of a whole financial institution, and the specific 
areas responsible for the downgrade. The rating for SEER goes form 1 (best) to 5 (worst) the 
same way than for CAMEL(S). (Gilbert, Meyer, & Vaughan, 2000) FDIC’s SCOR is another 
example of the similar on-site bank failure predicting tool. Extension for SCOR, FDIC created its 
own CAEL system,  which  works  the  same way  than  CAMELS,  but  its  quantitative  part  of  the  
analysis is mainly based on off-site data. (Jagtiani, Kolari, Lemieux, & Shin, 2003) 
 
There  still  has  been  demand for  models  not  only  predicting  failures  but  also  the  timing  of  the  
failure. That kind of information is naturally very valuable for regulators and banks’ managers. 
One example of the model detecting also the timing of the possible failure is called Canary and it 
has been created by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). It estimates the 
likelihood of the failure and the probability that the bank survives beyond a two-year period. The 
set of explanatory variables includes nonperforming loans, provisions for loan, and capital-asset 
ratios as well as economic indicators such as interest rates, wages, and unemployment rates. 
Those variables are then compared against the historical benchmarks, which state the probability 
of the potential bankruptcy of the bank. (Hawke, 2000) 
 
Not all periods are covered with bankruptcies, and therefore models for predicting failures have 
been difficult to build. For example, the French Banking Commission’s Support System for 
Banking Analysis (SAAB) estimates not straight the possible failure but the potential future losses 
of  the  bank.  However,  these  kinds  of  models  are  beyond the  scope  of  this  study,  since  in  the  
concentration is on complete bank failures and ways of predicting them. 
 
 2.4.2 Academicmodels
 
There is a long history of predicting bankruptcies in the finance and economics literature using 
only the off-site data. In this chapter the evolution of the bankruptcy predicting models is 
covered. First, earlier models are explained and second, more modern and sophisticated models 
are illustrated. 
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2.4.2.1 Earliermodels
 
Paired-sample technique generates major part of the bankruptcy prediction models. One part of 
the data is  gathered from firms or banks that eventually  failed,  whereas the other part  includes 
data from solid companies at that same period of time. Then, traditionally, a number of plausible 
financial ratios are studied from the financial statements that were published before the failure. 
Next, an equation that best discriminates between companies that failed and companies that 
remained solvent is developed by using either single ratio or combination of ratios. 
 
Beaver (1966) is one of the first researchers implementing financial ratio analysis for bankruptcy 
prediction. Unlike subsequent studies, Beaver uses broad definition of bankruptcy in his research, 
defining a firm to be failed if it faces bankruptcy, bond defaults, overdrawn bank accounts, or has 
missed preferred dividends. The broadening of the definition does not seem to have any 
substantially impact on empirical results. In his study Beaver finds three individual financial 
ratios, which are well suited to predict financial failure: cash flow to total assets, net income to 
total debt, and cash flow to total debt. It should be noted that each of these ratios consist of a 
flow variable involving earnings or cash flow divided by a stock variable. In his research Beaver 
derives cut-off points for each ratio so that companies with ratios above the cut-off point are 
classified  as  possible  non-failures,  while  those  with  lower  ratios  are  considered  as  potential  
failures.  These cut-off  points are derived from an original  sample,  but are then used to classify 
firms also in a holdout sample. As a result, he concludes that single ratios can predict 
bankruptcies rather well.  
 
Altman presented in 1968 similar idea than Beaver in 1966 that firms with certain financial 
structure have greater probability to fail within the next period compared to companies with 
opposite characteristics. Altman, however, felt that basing bankruptcy prediction only on a single 
ratio is too simplistic to capture the complexity of financial failure, although Beaver’s model gives 
surprising accurate predicting results. Altman’s tool for analyzing failures is multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA), which is a statistical technique used to classify a categorical dependent having 
more than two categories, and using it as predictors for number of independent variables. In his 
study, MDA is used to construct a predictive algorithm based on five key financial ratios: working 
capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
to total assets, market value equity to book value of total debt, and sales to total assets. With help 
of those variables so called Z-index or Z-score is calculated. 
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The Z-index is one of the first statistical off-site models for predicting bankruptcies. Although it 
is built for companies and not for banks the model is still worth of a bit deeper analysis. The 
MDA computes the discriminant coefficient, while the independent variables are the actual 
values. As was mentioned, Altman chooses five key ratios that include the most of the financial 
information.  One  major  reason  for  that  is  the  statistical  limitation  of  the  Z-index;  there  is  a  
reason to believe that some measurements have a high degree of correlation or collinearity with 
each other. This naturally forces the researcher to keep the predictive variables in limited 
numbers. 
 
As a first notable bankruptcy prediction model, Altman’s Z-index has been disputed greatly. 
Academic discussion seems to disagree what are the key ratios that should be used in the analysis. 
For  example,  Boritz  (1991)  finds  as  many  as  65  different  financial  ratios  used  as  predictors  in  
bankruptcy  studies.  Moreover,  Hamer  (1983)  argues  that  ratios  selected  to  the  analysis  do  not  
have notable effect on the model’s ability to predict failure. Karels and Prakash (1987) suggest 
quite opposite encouraging researchers carefully to select the financial ratios to include to the 
model, in order to improve prediction accuracy.  
 
Not all the models are based on financial ratios deriving directly from financial statements. For 
example, cash flow models are based on fundamental financial assumption that company’s value 
equals the net present value of its expected future cash flows. The company files for bankruptcy 
if  it  does  not  have  sufficient  cash  available  to  service  debt  outflows  as  they  become  due.  If  
assumption that current cash flows predict future financial status of the company, then it can be 
argued that past and present cash flows are good indicators of both company’s value and 
eventually probability of bankruptcy. Gentry, Newbold, and Whitford (1985a and 1985b) and 
Aziz, Emanuel, and Lawson (1988), among others, use this assumption while building cash flow 
model of bankruptcy. In the model, the value of the firm is derived from the ratio of streams of 
the discounted cash flows to and from operations, government, lenders, and shareholders. In 
their studies, matched bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms are compared, and it has been found 
that the group means for operating cash flows and cash taxes paid differ significantly in all five 
years prior to bankruptcy. The presented findings seem intuitively reasonable, since the company 
that is close to failure has made reckless investment decisions and operational efficiency can be 
expected to be weak. In addition, while all the companies are minimizing their tax payments, 
distressed companies with low level of earnings have practically no tax liabilities. If accuracy of 
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the  two  models,  Altman’s  Z-index  and  cash  flow  models  is  compared,  Aziz,  Emanuel,  and  
Lawson (1989) conclude that cash flow model is superior to the Z-index.  
 
One should note that Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan used Z-index to create an updated 
bankruptcy prediction tool called ZETA in 1977. The new model, however, is a proprietary effort 
from researchers, which is the reason why it does not fully disclose the parameters of the market. 
This may be the explanation why the whole upgrade of the Z-index has been occult from the 
academic discussion. Only Scott (1981) has studied the model and concluded that it is well suited 
for bankruptcy prediction. 
  
Gambler’s ruin theory is a bankruptcy prediction model worth mentioning, although it turns out 
to be too simple for the failure forecasting. Wilcox and Vinso in their studies in the 1970s based 
bankruptcy prediction models on that theory (for example Wilcox 1973 and 1976, and Vinso 
1979). The simple idea of the theory is that the gambler begins the game with a random amount 
of money. He wins a dollar with a probability p or loses a dollar with a probability 1 – p. The 
game goes on until the gambler or his component loses all the money. In financial applications 
the firm is viewed as the gambler, and bankruptcy occurs when the firm’s net worth falls to zero. 
Naturally, the model used in bankruptcy prediction is well developed from the example 
presented; the logic remains nevertheless the same.  
 
Beaver (1968) is one of the first researchers analyzing relationship between bankruptcy 
probability and stock returns. He finds that equity returns predict bankruptcy earlier than 
financial ratios in general, which is consistent with market efficiency hypothesis. Altman and 
Brenner (1981) and Clark and Weinstein (1983), conclude that the stock market indicates 
bankruptcy at least a year before it happens. In addition, Clark and Weinstein (1983) find that 
bankrupt firms lose approximately 26 % of their capital during the two-month period 
surrounding the bankruptcy declaration date. One dimension to the stock return analysis is given 
by Aharony, Jones, and Swary (1980) while suggesting a bankruptcy prediction model based on 
the variance of market returns. They conclude that the volatility of firm-specific returns increases 
as bankruptcy converges. Some level of differences in behavior of variances in returns between 
failed and non-failed companies can be seen as early as four years prior the failure. Although the 
approaches presented give a useful tool to predict bank failures, they can be employed only for 
firms and banks quoted in stock exchange. This naturally cause severe limitation to the models. 
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Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model is one addition for bankruptcy studies. In its 
framework the value of a company’s equity is viewed as an option, which is valuable at the time 
the company’s debt matures only if the debt can be paid in full. The assumption of the model 
states that the market value of the firm follows a diffusion-type stochastic process with known 
parameters. In their papers Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) make an assumption that 
the firm’s debt consists of a single pure discount bond. To ease this assumption in order to make 
the model more realistic Schwartz (1977) provides methods that can be used to obtain a solution 
in a situation when a firm is expected to have several debt issues that must pay interest and 
principal on different date. Schwartz’s model differs somewhat from the model created by Black 
and Scholes (1973), but the logic behind it remains the same. In general, the option pricing 
methodology can be therefore considered as useful bankruptcy prediction tool. However, it does 
not contain any earnings or cash flow variables causing limitations to the model. 
 
In order to cover losses companies can sell securities alongside with its assets. Two kinds of 
models  have  been  created  around  this  idea.  The  first  model,  created  by  Scott  (1976),  assumes  
perfect access to external capital. This is an opposite view compared to gambler’s ruin theory, 
where after losing the company’s money the firm falls into bankruptcy. Another model 
developed also by Scott (1981) lies somewhere between Scott’s previous model (1976) and 
gambler’s ruin theory stating that a firm has a limited access to security markets. Following 
assumptions change the perfect-access model into a model with imperfect access: a firm may face 
flotation costs when it sells securities, there may be a personal tax system that favors corporate 
investments that are internally-funded, or systematic imperfections in the market’s pricing of 
securities may limit corporate access to external capital. As can be noticed, here the model with 
imperfect access seems more realistic one and is therefore also more reliable model for 
bankruptcy prediction. Although pure external capital access models have not been presented 
since Scott’s paper in 1981, elements from these models can be found from bankruptcy studies. 
 
One of the most important extensions to the bankruptcy literature lies in the area of banking. 
The first study falling into this field is from Mayer and Pifer (1970). They use a similar approach 
as Altman in 1968 and find that financial ratios can predict the failure of the banks rather 
accurately with a lead-time of one or two years. The methodology Mayer and Pifer employ is a 
simple regression although they state that the distributional assumptions of discriminant analysis 
are appropriate while using the bank data. In addition, one interesting application for statistical 
EWSs was presented by Batte et al. (2007), who created a model where predictive rules jointly use 
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traditional accounting ratios and factors deriving from the long-term debt repayment schedule of 
the firm. The benefit of taking long-term debt schedule information into account is the 
improvement in the efficiency of the prediction especially when focusing on long, over three 
years, time horizons. 
 
Santomero and Vinso (1977) used gambler’s ruin model while detecting bank failures. As 
mentioned earlier, the attempts to apply this model for company bankruptcy prediction have 
been somewhat insufficient. One reason being the assumption that cash flow results from series 
of independent trials, regardless the management action. The bank failure probabilities estimated 
in the study are once more rather low, making the model rather unconvincing. In addition, 
researchers have not provided a test for the model. 
 
 
2.4.2.2 Modernmodels
 
In addition to the methodologies mentioned, different kinds of logit and probit models are also 
commonly used in failure predicting studies. Zavgren (1985), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), 
and Thomson (1991) among others, conclude that reliable results can be derived from financial 
ratios by using logistic regression. In logit model the failure indicator is a binary variable (zero-
one), estimated using a set of explanatory variables such as financial ratios as Altman (1968) in his 
study. By using the logit estimation, the predicted outcomes are restricted to lay in the unit 
interval, and are considered as the probability of failure. With this methodology, it is possible to 
evaluate the explanatory contribution of each independent variable, which can be seen as an 
advantage of the model. One can also find probit models in couple of bankruptcy studies, but as 
Maddala  (1983)  argues  the  unequal  frequency  of  the  failed  and  non-failed  samples  suggests  the  
use of logit model rather than probit estimation, since the logistic regression is not as sensitive to 
the uneven sampling frequency problem as probit model. The logit model used in this study is 
explained more precisely in section three, where the methodology of the thesis is presented.   
 
In the field of bank failure predicting, researchers have realized that bankruptcy models need to 
be slightly different for emerging markets than for developed banking industries. The major 
differences between developing and western banking sectors can be seen in their levels of 
liquidity, accounting deficiencies, and supervisory framework. For example, González-
Hermosillo,  Pazarbasioglu,  and  Billings  (1996)  as  well  as  Dabos  and  Sosa  Escudero  (2004)  
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examines  bank  failures  in  Latin  America  by  using  two-step  survival  or  hazard  analysis  and  
duration  models.  Although the  valid  data  set  for  bankruptcy  studies  may  be  different  for  Latin  
America and U.S., the failure studying methodology is nevertheless reliable.  
 
The survival analysis is one way of predicting bank failures and it has been mainly used in medical 
and biological studies. Lancaster brought the analysis for the use of unemployment studies in 
1990, where it moved to bank failure prediction later on. The model itself is quite complex and 
only the main points are illustrated here. The procedure employed by González-Hermosillo, 
Pazarbasioglu, and Billings (1996) in their bankruptcy study has two steps. First, the probability 
of  failure  and  the  factors  affecting  the  likelihood of  bankruptcy  is  determined.  In  this  case  the  
regulators intervention is a discrete variable, which can take value of one (intervention) or zero 
(no intervention). The way of estimating the failure probability is done by using logit model in 
panel data context. Second step in survival analysis is to determine the factors explaining the 
duration of a state of solvency. The main issue survival models emphasize is the conditional 
probability, which is the likelihood that the event will end in ’the next period’ given that it has not 
already ended. Intuitively, the question best answered through the survival analysis is “what is the 
probability that bank will fail during ‘the next period’ if it has survived so far?” For more 
precisely explanation of the methodology please see for example Kiefer (1988). 
 
With the two-step-modeling one can derive both the probability and timing of the potential bank 
failure. The data used in the González-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu, and Billings’ (1996) research is 
gathered quarterly, not annually, which improves the accuracy of the prediction. Nevertheless, the 
model has couple of limitations too. First, the model creation requires substantial amount of data, 
and can be therefore difficult to derive if the banking sector have absorbed new features or 
instruments affecting the banking business and only couple of banks have failed since then. 
Second, using it as EWS requires further elaboration until the results can be considered to point 
signals of distress. Finally, the data for the model is gathered around the banking crisis period, 
which makes the implication of the results rather challenging for more stable periods. 
 
Machine learning techniques can be seen as the newest branch of bankruptcy prediction models. 
The artificial intelligence models require specified computer hardware and software, which makes 
the methodology implementation rather challenging. However, a couple of interesting application 
can be found from the finance literature. Tam and Kiang (1992) applied so called neural network 
learning algorithm while making a comparison between failed and non-failed banks and argue 
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that neural networks offer better predictive accuracy than discriminant analysis. A neural network 
consists of a number of interconnected processing units, where each unit is a solitary 
computation device. The behavior of the unit is modeled by using the following logic: one 
specific unit obtaining input signal from other units, thus combining those signals based on an 
input function, and finally producing an output signal based on an output or transfer function. 
The signal generated is then transferred to other units as directed by the topology of the 
networks. The result of the final output unit of the route defines whether the bank is predicted to 
fail or not.  
 
Other methods from the artificial intelligence field such as evolutionary computation have been 
rarely used for the bankruptcy prediction modeling. However, some authors, such as Kim and 
Han (2003) and Brabazon and Keenan (2004), have used genetic algorithms (GA) either on its 
own or as a hybrid method with neural networks for insolvency prediction problems. In addition, 
most of the approaches from the evolutionary computation field use genetic programming (GP) 
again  as  its  own or  as  a  hybrid  method with  neural  networks.  GAs  provide  a  stochastic  search  
procedure based on principles of neural genetics and survival of the fittest. The main difference 
between  GA and  GP is  the  GA’s  more  primitive  role  in  decision  making,  whereas  GP can  be  
seen as an extension to the GA. In GA the structures in the population are fixed-length character 
strings that encode candidate solutions to a problem, whereas in GP structures are programs that, 
when executed, are the candidate solutions to the problem. One important advantage of the GP 
approach to bankruptcy prediction is it capability to yield the rules relating the measured data to 
the likelihood of becoming bankrupt (Alfaro-Cid, Sharman, & Esparcia-Alcázar, 2007). Thus, for 
example, a financial analyst can see which factors and functions are important for predicting 
bankruptcy.  
 
Fuzzy set theory can also be counted to the field of artificial intelligence models. Fuzzy set is 
originally proposed by Zadeh (1965), but different modern applications from the model have 
been constructed since then. In short, it is a theory of graded concepts. Fuzzy logic uses human 
experiential knowledge to model domain. In prediction problems fuzzy logic implements the 
knowledge of the domain expert and utilizes fuzzy mathematics to come out with fuzzy inference 
systems. Michael et al. (1999), among others, proposed fuzzy rule generator method for 
bankruptcy prediction and compared it with numerous other predicting models. They conclude 
that fuzzy set is well suited for bankruptcy prediction and actually outperforming all other 
methods. 
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Kolari et al. (1996) brought the so called trait recognition (TR) analysis to the field of failure 
prediction in commercial banking. The model is first applied in forecasting probability of 
earthquakes and the existence of mineral deposits, and has been used in bank failure prediction 
quite rarely. One reason might be the newness of the model and the lack of computer programs 
that can run the analysis. The model is, however, somewhat more straightforward than other 
artificial intelligence models.  
 
The reasons why Kolari et al. (1996) test this non-parametric model in bank failures, is the 
limitations of the dependent regression widely used in EWSs. They point out three main 
drawbacks  of  the  earlier  EWS.  First,  it  is  a  demanding  task  to  determine  which  explanatory  
variables are the most useful in predicting the bank failure. The result of the dependent 
regression analysis indicates only effectiveness of the independent variable in discriminating 
between failed and non-failed banks. The same problem has been noticed by Boritz (1991). 
Second, the dependent regression analysis lack information about how each explanatory variable 
affects Type I and II errors per se. Third, the previous EWS models are not appropriate for 
examining relations between variables. Finally, Lanine and Vander Vennet (2006) state that one 
major disadvantage of the parametric approaches is their dependence on distributional 
assumptions for the explanatory variables. Naturally, TR has also limitations as it requires 
substantial amounts of discretionary judgment, which may create estimation bias to the model. 
 
After inclusive introduction of the bank failure models, more detailed explanation of the logit 
model  is  provided  in  the  next  section  with  the  dataset  gathering  process  illustration.  The  main  
focus is on function of the logit model as well as the bank sample and independent variables used 
in the empirical analysis. 
 
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3 EMPIRICALMETHODOLOGYANDDATA
 
This section provides reasons why logit model has been selected as the methodology for the 
study. Also more precise explanation about the model is presented. The end of the section is 
used to illustrate the data applied in the analysis. 
 
 
3.1 LogitModel
 
As explained in previous section logistic regression has been used considerably lot in bank failure 
prediction.  It  gives  accurate  estimates  and  is  user-friendly  tool  for  analyzing  bankruptcies.  For  
example,  Jagtinali  el  al.  (2003)  argue  that  quite  simple  logit  model  can  beat  much sophisticated  
and  complex  trait  recognition  model  with  the  same data.  They  continue  that  the  quality  of  the  
logit model should be tested under different economic conditions and therefore different period 
of time. As the data Jagtinali et al. (2003) used in their study dates back to 1980s, and the context 
of U.S. banking industry has changed since then, it is beneficial to apply the data from 2000s. 
 
Another reason why logistic regression is preferable compared to other accurate predicting 
models is its easiness to use as statistical software for running the logit model is available. In this 
thesis Stata software is employed, but naturally all the other generally exercised statistical 
programs could be used. In addition, the feature of providing explanatory power of all the 
independent variables can be seen as an advantage of the logit model. 
 
Logistic regression lies on an assumption that the probability of a failure depends on a vector of 
independent variables. Using the logit estimation, the predicted outcomes are limited to lie in the 
unit interval, and are construed as the probability of an event. The logit model has the statistical 
property of not assuming multivariate normality among the independent variables, contrary to 
the probit model that does assume a normal distribution of the data. This can be seen as an 
advantage when analyzing banking data, as it generally is not normally distributed. The dependent 
variable p is logarithm of the financial institution’s, i’s, probability of capital inadequacy versus 
capital adequacy as shown in equation below 
 
1   log
pi
1 pi
ª
¬«
º
¼»
 a1  a2X i1  a3X i2  ... an X in
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where a = a1, a2, … an is a vector of regression coefficient for forecasting variables Xi, where i = 
1, 2, …, n. (Maddala & Lahiri, 2009) The purpose of the forthcoming analysis is to find the most 
reliable vectors and estimation values for every a of the study.  
 
One major disadvantage of the logit model, as any parametric model, is that it is not well suited 
for exploring interactions between variables as Kolari et al. (1996) state. The reason behind the 
problem is the loss in degree of freedom, when the variable set increases. In order to decrease the 
dilemma, variables can be computed by multiplying two variables, which unfortunately tends to 
reduce the information. According to Aldrich and Nelson (1984) logit model also needs at least 
50 observations per parameter in order to produce unbiased logit test statistics. Moreover, Stone 
and Raps (1991) present logit sample size requirements by creating a simulation study in order to 
assess  the  effect  of  the  overall  sample  size,  disparity  of  response  group  size,  and  the  number,  
skewness, and distribution of predictor variables. They state that in a case of four to six 
predictors and skewed data, as with accounting data, sample size of 200 or more will be needed 
to guarantee that logit test statistics will be properly calibrated. In this regard, when sample sizes 
are smaller, logit test statistics is moderately miscalibrated. However, Stone and Rasp (1991) argue 
that most of the increase in classification errors was due to variable skewness rather than small 
sample sizes. This is a crucial point to bear in mind, when analyzing the results in section four, 
since the data used in the study will cover only 124 banks. Therefore, the test results logit model 
presents need to be diagnosed with great deliberation.  
 
 
3.2 Data
 
In this chapter the data of the study is carefully presented. The sample banks, independent 
variables, and the reasons for choosing exactly those financial institutions and parameters are 
provided. First, the procedure of the bank sampling is explained and thereafter explanatory 
variables are illustrated. 
 
 3.2.1 BankSamples
 
In order to construct a reliable model for predicting commercial bank failures the sample banks 
need to be limited only for large financial institutions. Thus the sample consists of the 
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commercial banks that failed in the U.S. during 2007 and 2009 and whose asset value was at the 
time of failure worth more than 500 million dollars. As smaller banks have slightly different 
earning logic and because their significance for the economy is somewhat smaller, they are not 
included to the sample. 
 
Failed banks are defined as insured institutions for which disbursements by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) required following to their closure. By limiting the sample banks 
to include only FDIC guaranteed institutions, the data gathering became substantially easier as 
the data is compiled from the FDIC database. 62 failed FDIC guaranteed commercial banks with 
assets worth over 500 million dollars were then selected. As can be assumed, there are thousands 
of active commercial banks in the U.S. even after the crisis period. Regarding to FDIC database 
there are currently 7,941 active FDIC guaranteed commercial banks in the U.S. In order to avoid 
the biasness and miscalibration of the data the matched-pair sample need to be created. Matching 
is done by searching a pair for all 62 failed financial institutions. The active bank is considered to 
be a match with a failed one when its asset size is close to the bankruptcy bank at the quarter of 
failure. The matched-pair procedure could also be done more accurately by choosing active banks 
sharing not only the same value of assets than failed banks but also the same state. As the 
banking crisis is, however, nationwide, as Figure 5 below illustrates, that kind of selection would 
not probably have an impact on the forthcoming analysis in any substantial way. The total bank 
sample covers 124 financial institutions after the matched-pair procedure. 
 
Figure 5. Bank Failure Locations 
 
Source: FDIC database 
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Most of the EWSs measure whether the model can predict the failure one or two years prior the 
bankruptcy.  In  this  study  the  data  gathering  will  start  from  three  years,  in  other  words  12  
quarters, before the failures and will end up to one quarter prior the bankruptcy. Years are 
divided into quarters in order to improve to predicting accuracy.  It  would be beneficial  to rank 
the banks based on their value of assets and then divide them equally to both the original and 
holdout samples by using every other matched pair. The original sample would then be used to 
build the bank failure forecasting model and the holdout sample to study the predictive power of 
the model created. As the sum of failed over 500-million-dollar banks is limited to 62, that kind 
of division would decrease the degree of freedom too much as Aldrich and Nelson (1984) and 
Stone and Raps (1991) explain. Therefore, the data is limited to original sample, which is carefully 
analyzed is order to create a reliable failure predicting model.  
 
Next the independent variables applied in the study are presented. The variables used in the study 
are liquidity, credit risk, profitability and taxes, growth, loan and deposit mix, securities, and 
instability as was mentioned already in section two. 

3.2.2 IndependentVariables
 
In order to create an accurate bank failure prediction model several fragility factors and 
independent variables need to be included to the analysis. Following studies have worked as a 
benchmark while choosing explanatory off-site variables: Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), 
Zmijewski (1984), Thompson (1991), Kolari et al. (1996), Jagtiani et al. (2003), Dabos and 
Escudero  (2004),  and  Lanine  et  al.  (2006).  As  was  covered  in  theoretical  part  of  the  study  the  
most commonly used financial ratios can forecast potential failures rather well. In addition, a 
couple of infrequently appeared ratios are added into the variable set, since the banks’ decision of 
engaging to risky securities needs to be analyzed. That kind of selection concludes to 32 different 
financial ratios. The importance of every financial fragility elements was explained in section two. 
However, a detailed discussion concerning the chosen explanatory variables still needs to be 
presented. Definitions provided by FDIC (2008) are used in the explanation of independent 
variables. 
 
Liquid assets. Tradable securities practically equals to notes and coins as they can 
be sold at very short notice. Therefore, in case of banking panic, banks can sell 
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them quickly in order to respond to the increasing withdrawals. Moreover, when a 
bank ties its assets to liquid securities it improves the bank’s cushion in the case of 
crisis. In this study, securities are defined as total investment securities excluding 
securities  held  in  trading  accounts.  The  used  ratio  is  determined  as  total  security  
holdings to total assets.   
 
Uninsured deposits. FDIC guarantees time certificates of deposits and open-
account  time  deposits  with  balances  of  100,000  dollars.  If  value  of  loss  exceeds  
100,000 dollars, there is no insurance for that money and the losses need to be 
covered by the bank or the depositor. This is naturally risky for the depositors, and 
the higher the ratio of time deposits of 100,000 dollars or more to total time 
deposits, the lower the credibility and trust of the bank in the case of crisis.  
 
Loan exposure and loan funding. Loan exposure is determined as the ratio of total 
loans and leases to total assets. Total loans and leases are defined as total loans and 
lease financing receivables, net of unearned income. As can be assumed the more 
the  bank  has  loans  and  leases  the  more  vulnerable  it  is  for  the  default  of  its  
customers. Loan funding illustrates similar risk, but the dominator of the ratio is 
total deposits instead of total assets.  
 
Nonaccrual rate. The ratio is determined as assets in nonaccrual status to total 
assets. Asset can be stated as nonaccrual, when its principal and interest is unpaid 
for at least 90 days and is no longer accruing interest. Obviously, imprudent lending 
decisions inflate the nonaccrual asset ratio and expose the bank for difficulties.  
 
Past due loan rate. Assets at least 90 days deferred, but still accruing interest are 
considered to be past due loans. Therefore, past due assets can be seen to belong 
to less terminal loan class than nonaccrual assets. The ratio is determined as assets 
past due 90 or more days to total assets.   
 
Loan loss allowance and provision rate. Loan loss allowance is a valuation account 
with a running balance of the allowances for loan losses established to report loans 
receivable at their net realizable value. The allowance for loan losses is reduced 
when a loan or a portion of a loan is written off as uncollectible. The allowance for 
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loan losses is increased when a provision for loan losses is established. The 
provision for loan losses is the periodic expense for loan losses established in the 
current period. Loan loss allowance ratio is determined as loss allowance to total 
loans and leases. Provision rate, on the other hand, is defined as provision for loan 
and lease losses to total assets.  
 
Loss rate. The banks are required to perform charge-offs when the actual loan 
losses occur. The loss rate equals to the net loan and lease financing receivable 
charge-offs to total loans and lease financing receivables. The loss rate 
demonstrates similar way than loan loss allowance and provision rate the level of 
credit risk the bank is exposed. As can be concluded, the high level of net charge-
offs is an alarming sign of banking problems. 
 
Capital ratio. The rate is determined as equity capital to total assets. Banks with 
substantial amounts of equity in their balance sheets are considered to be more 
solid ones as they possess better cushion for the unexpected predicament. 
 
ROA and ROE. Return on assets (ROA) measures how profitable and, therefore, 
solvent the bank is. It is defined as net income after taxes and extraordinary items 
to total assets. Similar ratio, return on equity (ROE), is also providing information 
about the bank’s profitability. Now, however, the denominator is total equity 
instead of total assets. 
 
Dividend rate. It can be argued that when a company or a bank is profitable and in 
stable  stage  it  tends  to  distribute  generous  dividends.  Dividend  rate  is  defined  as  
cash dividend paid on common and preferred shares to total assets. 
 
Net interest margin and net operating margin. Both of the variables continue to 
measure how profitable the bank is. Net interest margin is defined as total interest 
income less total interest expense to total assets. Net operating margin, on the 
other hand, is determined as net operating income to total assets. 
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Tax exposure. Solid and solvent banks tend to pay higher taxes than banks facing 
severe profitability problems. Applicable income taxes to total assets is a ratio that 
measures the tax exposure of a bank. 
 
Capital and loan growth. Banks with growing capital levels are typical in good 
condition. The capital growth rate is determined as the change between the levels 
of total equity in previous and current periods to current level of total equity. Loan 
growth can, on the other hand, be considered to be a signal of increased level of 
risk of the bank. Loan growth ratio is also defined by comparing current and 
previous levels of total loans and leases to current level of total loans and leases. 
 
Loan mix. Different kinds of loan types do not necessarily share the same risk 
profile. Loan mix ratios are testing the difference in level of risk between 
commercial,  real  estate,  agricultural,  and  credit  card  loans.  The  risk  ratios  are  
created by dividing the different loan types to total loans and leases. It is also 
studied if the risk of failure can be reduced by diversifying the loans granted evenly 
between different loan types. Loan diversification is measured by sum of squared 
proportions of the four loan mix ratios. 
 
Demand deposit mix and time deposit mix. Demand deposits mix is determined as 
demand deposits to total deposits. By definition demand deposits can be 
withdrawn at any time without a notice. Time deposits, however, include deposits 
that cannot be withdrawn for a certain period of time. In the case of financial crisis 
banks with more demand deposits instead of time deposits seem to have a better 
cushion against the failure. Time deposit mix is determined as time deposits to total 
deposits.  
 
Securities. Banks can also invest in securities and actually in the subprime crisis it 
was stated that banks should have avoided risky instruments such as ABSs, MBSs, 
or CMOs. Instead risk free government debt securities should have been favored in 
order to limit the risk. The ratios are defined as MBSs to total securities, ABSs to 
total  securities,  CMOs  to  total  assets,  and  government  debt  securities  to  total  
securities. 
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Instability. It can be argued that size of solvent banks’ assets do not vary 
substantially between periods, in other words asset variation is minimal. The ratio 
measuring the variation is defined as current level of total assets to year-to-date 
average of total assets. Similar variation ratios is also determined to total loans and 
leases as well as equity capital. 
 
As mentioned in theoretical part of the study, big financial institutions tend to be more solvent 
than  smaller  ones.  In  this  thesis,  however,  the  banks’  asset  size  is  applied  in  matched-pair  
procedure erasing the possibility of exploring the impact of financial institutions size on failures. 
Therefore, independent variables such as number of employees or total deposits are not included 
to the dataset. 
 
As can be seen many of the variables, also provided in Table 2 next page, are considerably related 
to one another. This raises questions whether one can benefit the variables in the same model 
without facing the problem of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity refers to situation where two or 
more predictor variables are highly, but not perfectly, correlated. In this situation, the coefficient 
estimates may change erratically in response to small changes of the model or the data. 
Multicollinearity, however, does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a 
whole; it only affects calculations regarding individual predictors. (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1997) 
Therefore, it is crucial to minimize the problem of multicollinearity in order to receive reliable 
values for coefficients. This can be achieved by measuring correlation between variables and 
creating several alternative models that do not include explanatory variables strongly correlating 
with each other. The accurate explanation of the procedure is provided in the next section.  
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Table 1. Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
 
Soure: Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Zmijewski (1984), Thompson (1991), Kolari et al. (1996), Jagtiani et al. 
(2003), Dabos and Escudero (2004), and Lanine et al. (2006) 
Financial ratios Definition
Liquidity
Liquid assets Total security holdings / Total assets
Uninsured deposits Time deposits of $100,000 or more / Total time deposits
Credit Risk
Loan exposure Total loans and leases / Total assets
Loan funding Total loans and leases / Total deposits
Nonaccrual rate Assets in nonaccrual status / Total assets
Past due loan rate Assets past due 90 or more days / Total assets
Loan loss allowance Loss allowance / Total loans and leases
Provision rate Provision for loan and lease losses / Total assets
Loss rate Net charge-offs / Total loans and leases
Capital ratio Equity capital / Total assets
Profitability and taxes
Return on assets Net income / Total assets
Return on equity Net income / Total equity
Dividend rate Cash dividends / Total assets
Net interest margin Net interest income / Total assets
Net operating margin Net operating income / Total assets
Tax exposure Applicable income taxes / Total Assets
Growth
Capital growth (Total equityt - Total equityt-1) / Total equityt
Loan growth (Total loans and leasest - Total loans and leasest-1) / Total loans and leasest
Loan and deposit mix
Commercial loan risk Commercial and industrial loans / Total loans and leases
Real estate loan risk Total real estate loans / Total loans and leases
Agricultural loan risk Total agricultural loans / Total loans and leases
Credit card loan risk Credit card loans / Total loans and leases
Loan diversification Sum of squared proportions of the four loan mix ratios for each bank
Demand deposit mix Demand deposit / Total deposits
Time deposit mix Time deposits / Total deposits
Securities
MBS ratio Mortgage-backed securities / Total securities
ABS ratio Asset-backed securities / Total securities
CMO ratio Collateralized mortgage obligations / Total securities
Risk free securities Government debt securities / Total securities
Instability
Assets variation Total assets / Mean of total assets
Loans and leases variationTotal loans and leases / Mean of total loans and leases
Equity variation Total equity / Mean of equity capital
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4 EMPIRICALANALYSIS
 
In this section the analysis procedure and the results of the study are provided. As the purpose of 
the thesis is to construct reliable bank failure prediction model, the first step of the analysis is to 
reveal the explanation power of the independent variables. Then a correlation between the most 
reliable explanatory variables is studied leaving great variety of potential models with slightly 
different independent variables. The next step then is to test all the models in order to find the 
most accurate and reliable one. This procedure is followed by the discussion of credibility of the 
most statistically significant explanatory variables. Finally, the comparison between logit and 
probit models is provided in order to confirm the hypothesis that a logit model is more suitable 
for bank failure prediction than a probit model. 
 
 
4.1 AnalysisoftheIndependentVariables
 
The test of relevance of the independent variables is done in two ways. First, the mean between 
active and failed banks’ financial ratios is studied for all 12 quarters. The validity of the variables 
is studied by using the Student’s t-test at the 10 percent significance level.  In order to gain strong 
explanation power, the variable’s mean between failed and active banks need to be statistically 
significant at least in all three quarters before the failure. The variable also needs to be fairly 
consistent  with  time.  In  other  words,  explanation  power  should  decrease  as  time  from  the  
bankruptcy lengthens. With that kind of limitation, 17 financial ratios stand out: liquid assets, 
nonaccrual rate, loan loss allowance, provision rate, loss rate, capital ratio, return on assets, 
dividend  rate,  net  interest  margin,  net  operating  margin,  tax  exposure,  loan  growth,  real  estate  
loan risk, loan diversification, time deposit mix, CMO ratio, and loans and leases variation. If the 
difference in means is statistically significant at least in five quarters out of twelve the variables 
are considered to have a moderate explanation power. These variables are uninsured deposits, 
loan exposure, return on equity, capital growth, commercial loan risk, risk free securities, asset 
variation, and equity variation summing up to eight financial ratios. Remaining seven explanatory 
variables are considered to be irrelevant for the prediction model. The table illustrating the 
overall t-test results is provided in appendices. 
 
The second way to test the fitness of the variables is to explore how well one variable at the time 
predicts the probability of a bank failure. This is done by using a logit model and the data closets 
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to forthcoming failures. Results from the logit analysis and the first quarter’s t-test are provided 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Test of Explanatory Variables 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The purpose of running the single variable logit analysis is to examine whether the same seven 
financial ratios still lack statistical significance. Since the logit model is used at the first time, the 
headers of Table 2 should be explained. Wald chi2, Prob > chi2, and Pseudo R2 are all from the 
Failed Active t-test Wald chi2(1) Prob > chi2 Pseudo R2 CC ROC
Liquidity
Liquid assets 0,1028 0,1603 0,0016 4,88 0,0272 0,0614 68,55 % 0,7098
Uninsured deposits 0,2273 0,1877 0,0497 3,46 0,0628 0,0229 61,29 % 0,6015
Credit Risk
Loan exposure 0,7460 0,7074 0,1281 2,20 0,1380 0,0140 52,42 % 0,5825
Loan funding 0,9406 0,9367 0,9309 0,01 0,9289 0,0000 45,16 % 0,4342
Nonaccrual rate 0,1074 0,0199 0,0000 15,84 0,0001 0,4778 87,90 % 0,9121
Past due loan rate 0,0056 0,0031 0,2967 0,27 0,6044 0,0070 60,48 % 0,5905
Provision rate 0,0344 0,0031 0,0000 12,90 0,0003 0,3218 79,03 % 0,8650
Loss rate 5,0199 1,1880 0,0000 12,69 0,0004 0,2892 79,84 % 0,8585
Loan loss allowance 4,0315 1,7596 0,0000 11,81 0,0006 0,3602 84,68 % 0,8970
Capital ratio 3,2753 9,6546 0,0000 10,01 0,0016 0,4286 86,29 % 0,9305
Profitability and taxes
Return on assets -6,8633 0,1870 0,0000 19,28 0,0000 0,4717 86,29 % 0,9199
Return on equity -132,4739 -0,7230 0,0025 0,69 0,4075 0,0803 80,65 % 0,8824
Dividend rate 0,0005 0,0029 0,0627 1,12 0,2910 0,0587 70,16 % 0,7089
Net interest margin 2,2561 3,6376 0,0000 18,32 0,0000 0,2456 76,61 % 0,8226
Net operating margin -6,1698 0,3312 0,0000 20,89 0,0000 0,4742 85,48 % 0,9095
Tax exposure -0,0012 0,0013 0,0043 4,65 0,0310 0,0534 70,16 % 0,6933
Size and growth
Capital growth 13,2180 0,1211 0,3731 5,85 0,0156 0,0057 51,61 % 0,2053
Loan growth -0,0449 -0,0009 0,0093 0,71 0,4000 0,0572 76,61 % 0,8226
Loan and deposit mix
Commercial loan risk 0,1049 0,1362 0,1041 1,63 0,2010 0,0159 58,87 % 0,6446
Real estate loan risk 0,8345 0,7456 0,0143 3,26 0,0708 0,0375 60,48 % 0,6891
Agricultural loan risk 0,0116 0,0139 0,7967 0,05 0,8297 0,0004 54,84 % 0,6491
Credit card loan risk 0,0166 0,0325 0,4996 0,75 0,3850 0,0028 47,58 % 0,5018
Loan diversification 0,7661 0,6558 0,0014 8,30 0,0040 0,0606 60,84 % 0,6746
Demand deposit mix 0,0563 0,0689 0,3946 0,27 0,6027 0,0045 66,94 % 0,7019
Demand and time deposit mix 0,7155 0,5368 0,0000 9,61 0,0019 0,1607 75,81 % 0,8049
Securities
MBS ratio 0,5648 0,5487 0,7646 0,09 0,7639 0,0005 49,19 % 0,5479
ABS ratio 0,0174 0,0345 0,4068 0,41 0,5218 0,0042 54,03 % 0,5265
CMO ratio 0,2573 0,1649 0,0543 4,53 0,0332 0,0221 55,65 % 0,5035
Risk free securities 0,6332 0,7057 0,1751 1,96 0,1616 0,0109 54,03 % 0,4992
Instability
Assets variation 0,9543 1,0160 0,0000 9,92 0,0016 0,1642 75,81 % 0,7903
Loans and leases variation 0,9478 1,0025 0,0000 10,86 0,0010 0,2001 72,58 % 0,8156
Equity variation 0,4966 0,9931 0,0000 6,51 0,0107 0,2334 82,26 % 0,8660
Mean
Label
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statistical program Stata and are used for studying measurement of fit of logit and probit models. 
Wald chi2 is “the value of a likelihood-ratio chi-squared for the test of the null hypothesis that all 
of the coefficients associated with independent variables are simultaneously zero. The p-value is 
indicated by Prob > chi2. The number in parentheses is the number of coefficient being tested.” 
(Long  &  Freese,  2003)  In  other  words,  smaller  the  Prob  >  chi2  figure,  the  more  reliable  the  
model, and in this case the explanatory variable, is. Pseudo R2, on the other hand, is a measure of 
fit also known as McFadden’s R2 and is defined as 
 
2   ܴଶ = 1 െ ୪୬ ௅(ெಷೠ೗೗)
୪୬ ௅(ெ಺೙೟೐ೝ೎೐೛೟) 
 
where MFull is  the  model  with  predictors,  MIntercept is  the  model  without  predictors,  and  L  is  the  
estimated likelihood. In other words, ln L(MFull) presents the log-likelihood value for the fitted 
model and ln L(MIntercept) is the log-likelihood value for the null model excluding all explanatory 
variables. Pseudo R2 falls between 0 and 1, the same way than regression R2, with 0 indicating 
that the explanatory variables fail to increase likelihood and 1 indicating that the model perfectly 
predicts each observation. If one compares two models with different explanatory variables, 
pseudo R2 would be higher for the model with the greater estimated likelihood. It is notable that 
pseudo R2 can be kept as a reliable measure of fit between models with different data but same 
methodology. (Baum, 2006) In the case of comparing two different methodologies such as a logit 
model and a trait recognition analysis some other measurement of fit need to be applied. In other 
words, the superiority of the models cannot be compared with the help of pseudo R2. 
 
As it  is  desirable to be able to compare the empirical  results  of the analysis  between the results  
given  by  other  studies,  CC  percentage  and  ROC  figure  should  be  used.  CC  is  an  abbreviation  
from the words correctly classified. It provides a reliable measure of fit between the models and 
is therefore used for the same purpose than pseudo R2. The logic behind the method is 
somewhat different, since CC calculates the percentage of correctly classified instances. As the 
logit model provides an equation for predicting binary outcomes there are four possible 
outcomes for that equation. If the instance, in this case a bank, is active and is classified as active, 
it is counted as a true positive; if it is classified as failed, it is counted as a false negative (Type II 
error). In addition, if the bank is failed and is classified as failed, it is counted as a true negative; if 
it is classified as active, it is counted as a false positive (Type I error). In other words the higher 
the CC percentage, the smaller the number on Type I and II errors and more accurate the model. 
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) uses the same logic than CC and presents therefore 
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similar results than CC. ROC is a technique for visualizing and selecting classifiers based on their 
performance. A ROC graph is a two-dimensional graph in which true positive rate, equivalent to 
sensitivity, is plotted on the Y axis and the false positive rate, equivalent to (1 – specificity), is 
plotted on the X axis.  The best  possible prediction model  would yield a point in the upper left  
corner or coordinate (0,1) of the ROC space, representing 100% sensitivity, in other words no 
false negatives, and 100% specificity, no false positives. (Fawcett, 2006) In this thesis ROC figure 
presents the area under the ROC line having 1.0 when the model perfectly predicts bank failures 
and approximately 0.5 when the model cannot predict the failure. It is crucial to note that ROC 
and CC can falsely give an impression that the model is predicting well. In a binary model, such 
as this one, it is possible by chance to predict correctly at least 50% of the cases even without 
knowing independent variables. Therefore, the interval of the model’s predictability should be set 
between 0.7 and 1.0 for ROC, and 70% and 100% for CC. 
 
When all the methods explained are used as a part of the analysis, it can be stated from Table 2 
that loan funding, past due loan rate, agricultural loan risk, credit card loan risk, demand deposit 
mix,  MBS  ratio,  and  ABS  ratio  remain  irrelevant  for  the  final  model.  There  are  also  other  
explanatory variables that seem to be insignificant for the study. However, in order to maintain 
all the potentially valuable information in the long-term, all the variables that are given a strong or 
a moderate status in the Student’s t-test will remain in the analysis. 
 
Before entering the multicollinearity analysis one needs to note that independent variables from 
all the fragility factors stated in section two can be considered to be statistically significant for the 
bankruptcy prediction. Both variables of liquidity, liquid assets and uninsured deposits, have 
either strong or moderate explanation power, which proves that it is crucial for banks to maintain 
liquidity assets in their accounts in order to avoid possible bankruptcy. Credit risk, on the other 
hand, seems to be one of the most important prediction factors although loan funding and past 
due loan rate variables are statistically insignificant for the bank failure prediction. Nonaccrual 
rate, provision rate, loss rate, loan loss allowance, and capital ratio have strong and loan exposure 
moderate explanation power, which proves that banks need to be extremely cautious in their 
lending processes. Careless lending decisions can be seen as inflated level of credit risk, which 
seems to expose banks to great risk of bankruptcy.  
 
Profitability  and  taxes  is  the  other  element  of  bankruptcy  prediction  that  seems  to  be  
considerably important to include to bank failure forecasting models as return on assets, dividend 
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rate, net interest margin, net operating margin, tax exposure variables receives strong and return 
on equity moderate explanatory power status. Therefore, the hypothesis that banks are required 
to preserve the profitability cannot be rejected. Growth can also be considered to be an 
important factor behind the bank failure prediction. Loan growth has strong and capital growth 
moderate explanatory power both indicating that growing banks have enhanced likelihood to stay 
in the business. 
 
Loan  and  deposit  mix  give  rather  interesting  results.  Whereas  real  estate  risk  and  loan  
diversification variables have strong explanatory power, agricultural loan risk and credit card loan 
risk parameters stand out as insignificant variables for bank failure prediction. Commercial loan 
risk and risk free securities variables, on the other hand, have moderate explanation power. This 
indicates that the amount of loans granted to farmers and credit provided to consumers do not 
have  an  effect  on  banks’  bankruptcy  likelihood.  Time  deposits  mix,  however,  can  be  as  
substantially significant independent variable, whereas demand deposit mix remains indifferent 
explanatory variable for the bank failure prediction. Therefore, one can argue that failed and 
active  banks  seem  to  have  approximately  same  quantity  of  demand  deposits  in  their  accounts,  
whereas value of time deposits varies substantially. 
 
Finally, it can be stated that security holdings and financial institutions potential instability have 
an impact on potential bank failures. Whereas CMO ratio and risk free securities support the 
hypothesis that banks should invest government debt securities in order to avoid failures, ABS 
and MBS ratios seem to be indifferent for bankruptcy prediction. Therefore, it can be argued that 
failed and active banks invest approximately same amount of money to ABS and MBS securities, 
while there is a difference on how financial institutions invest in risk free and CMO securities. 
Instability variables, asset, loans and leases, and equity variations, seem to improve bank failure 
prediction as they have either strong or moderate explanatory power. Therefore, hypothesis that 
failing banks will present some level of volatility prior the potential failure cannot be rejected. 
 
As mentioned earlier, many of the statistically significant explanatory variables are closely related 
to each other. Therefore, potential multicollinearity needs to be detected and measured. The next 
chapter explores the procedure of minimizing the problem of multicollinearity while creating 
reliable bank failure detecting models. 
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4.2 MulticollinearityMinimizingandPlanAnalysis
 
As already mentioned, multicollinearity may cause reliability problems for coefficients when 
studying the independent variables. In order to minimize the problem, correlation between 
potentially important financial ratios is explored. When the correlation between variables rises 
above the absolute value of 0.5 both of the variables cannot be included to the same model. 
Because the overall prediction power can be seen as important as the relevance of the 
independent variables, the aim is to find a model with high overall prediction power with 
financial ratios that comport tolerably well together. 
 
By using the correlation analysis for all 25 independent variables, 72 different models can be 
created.  Those  72  models  are  titled  as  plans  in  order  to  attain  a  difference  between  the  final  
failure predicting model and sub-models that are used to derive the final model. Many differences 
between the plans are only between one or two variables. However, even minor changes can 
make a considerably difference between statistical significance of the plans. One of the most 
notable issue considering the correlation analysis is the fact that nonaccrual rate, net interest 
margin, net operating margin, and return on assets variables cannot be used together, since the 
smallest absolute value of correlation between mentioned variables is as high as 0.554. This is the 
base of the predicting models giving four different starting points, or plans, by using only one of 
the four financial ratios at a time. Provision rate is next under an examination showing strong 
correlation between all the other three variables stated above except the net interest margin 
variable. Therefore, provision rate cannot be applied simultaneously with nonaccrual rate, net 
operating margin, and return on assets variables. Also loss rate and loan loss allowance cannot be 
used together correlation being 0.583 between these two variables. The same way both of the 
variables are also strongly correlated with nonaccrual rate, net operating margin, return on assets, 
and provision rate. Again, net interest margin is the only variable having moderate correlation, 
around -0.300, with both of the loss rate and loan loss allowance ratios. This provides us six base 
plans as listed on next page. 
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Base plans: 
1. Nonaccrual rate 
2. Net operating margin 
3. Return on assets 
4. Net interest margin and provision rate 
5. Net interest margin and loss rate 
6. Net interest margin and loan loss allowance 
 
In addition, capital ratio is strongly correlated with all the base plans and thus needs to be left out 
of the analysis. The next step doubles the number of plans as loans and leases variation and assets 
variation variables are alternately added to the base plans. These two independent variables are 
highly correlated between each other and cannot therefore be used simultaneously. Due to high 
level of correlation, the decision to use either loan diversification parameter or commercial loan 
risk and real estate loan risk variables need to be made. In order to avoid losing any potentially 
relevant information, there will be models including both of the possibilities, although not 
simultaneously. This naturally doubles the number of plans once more summing the total number 
of plans to 24. 
 
Time deposit mix is strongly correlated with many variables already build into plans. The only 
base combinations with absolute correlation below 0.500 with the time deposit mix parameter are 
the plans with net operating margin and return on assets variables. As a result, time deposit mix 
ratio  is  added  to  all  plans  that  have  either  return  on  assets  or  net  operating  margin  as  a  base.  
Explanatory variables liquid assets and loan exposure are also strongly correlated between each 
other and cannot therefore be used simultaneously in the model. In order to add both of the 
variables to the plans, the doubling needs to be applied once again. Consequently, the number of 
plans has already risen to 48.  
 
Return on equity is not correlated in any notable way with any of the plans illustrated so far. It 
cannot, however, be used simultaneously with equity variation, which in fact also strongly 
correlates with net operating margin and base plans of number four and six. In order to sustain 
all the information that could be valuable for the final bank failure predicting model, return on 
equity  and  equity  variation  variables  are  applied  to  the  plans  they  seem  to  suite.  After  this  
procedure the amount of plans ascends to final number of 72. Rest of the explanatory variables 
can be added to all 72 plans at the same time. These variables are capital growth, tax exposure, 
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CMO ratio, uninsured deposits, risk free securities, dividend rate, and loan growth. The table of 
the correlation between all 25 variables is somewhat extensive and can, therefore, be found from 
the appendices. 
 
The next step is to run the logit analysis for all of 72 plans created. Data used in the analysis is 
from one quarter prior the forthcoming failures and includes therefore the most accurate figures 
to predict bankruptcies. The accuracy of the plan is tested with help of chi square distribution 
and pseudo R2 methods as well as CC and ROC figures. Since the purpose of the analysis is to 
maximize the number of correctly classified banks simultaneously minimizing the Type I and II 
errors, the main focus is on CC characteristic. Other statistical figures remain on background and 
are  studied  more  carefully  in  the  case  where  CC cannot  provide  separation  between  the  plans.  
Since the table of results from the plan analysis is rather extensive, it can again be found form the 
appendices. 
 
As Appendix 3 illustrates plans 52, 61, and 64 receive CC percentage of 95.16 %, which is slightly 
superior to other plans. Pseudo R2 for the plans in question is 0.6560, 0.6459, and 0.6488, and 
ROC values are 0.9688, 0.9659, and 0.9672, respectively. Mean for all 72 plans is 0.6529 for 
pseudo R2, 0.9641 for ROC, and 91.59 % for CC. The goodness of fit of the key plans is also 
provided in Table 3 next page. 
 
- 48 - 
 
Table 3. Explanation Power of the Key Plans 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
It is crucial to note that all three models share the same base plan, which includes nonaccrual rate 
variable. The similarity between plans continues as loan diversification, return on equity, capital 
growth, tax exposure, CMO ratio, uninsured deposits, risk free securities, dividend rate, and loan 
growth variables are present in all of the key plans. However, plan 61 includes loans and leases 
variation variable, whereas plans 52 and 64 contain assets variation ratio. Another difference 
between the plans can be seen between liquid assets and loan exposure variables. Plan 52 applies 
liquid assets as one of the explanation variables whereas plans 61 and 64 hold the loan exposure 
variable.  
 
To verify that the problem of multicollinearity is absent the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
studied for all of the three plans mentioned. VIF is defined as 
Variable Plan 52 Plan 61 Plan 64
Nonaccrual rate -77,9327** -81,5075** -81,2238**
Loans and leases variation 5,7942
Assets variation 7,2871 6,2504
Loan diversification 1,7358 1,5947 1,2182
Return on equity 0,0017* 0,0017* 0,0018*
Liquid assets 4,5987
Loan exposure -0,7494 0,2065
Capital growth 0,0105 0,0111 0,0112
Tax exposure 19,2633 10,2456 22,3697
CMO ratio -2,9660** -2,5886** -2,5508*
Uninsured deposits 5,1491 4,7258 4,4917
Risk free securities 4,6480*** 4,7729** 4,9809***
Dividend rate -18,7979 -34,2668 -32,7537
Loan growth 7,5084** 5,4798 6,2280*
Cons. -8,4924 -5,6533 -6,7260
Wald chi2(12) 35,70 35,06 36,46
Prob > chi2 0,0004 0,0005 0,0003
Pseudo R2 0,6560 0,6459 0,6488
CC 95,16 % 95,16 % 95,16 %
ROC 0,9688 0,9659 0,9672
Dependent variable is defined as 0 in the case of failure and 1 otherwise.
Index stars illustrate the significance level of the variables. One star 
presents 10% level of significance, whereas two and three stars state 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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3   ܸܫܨ(ߚ௜) = ଵଵିோ೔మ 
 
where  Ri2 is the squared multiple correlation coefficient between xi and the other explanatory 
variables. VIF can be interpreted as “the ratio of the actual variance of Ƣi to what the variance of 
Ƣi would have been had xi been uncorrelated with the remaining xs. In ideal situation is 
considered to be one where the xs are all uncorrelated with each other and the VIF compares the 
actual situation with an ideal situation.” (Maddala & Lahiri, 2009) If VIF, however, reaches the 
level of 5.0 problem of multicollinearity can be considered to be high. As one can realize R2 is not 
provided  in  the  logit  analysis  and  therefore  logit  model  needs  to  be  transferred  to  a  linear  
regression  model  in  order  to  get  VIF  figures.  The  procedure  does  not  have  an  impact  on  
predictability  of  the  model  since  the  final  results  are  studied  from the  logit  model  analysis,  not  
from the linear one. Linear regression is simply provided in order to study how severe the 
multicollinearity problem is, since the correlation between independent variables does not 
illustrate the level of multicollinearity, which is, after all, a property of the predictors not of the 
model.  Table  4  below presents  the  results  from the  VIF analysis  and  confirms  that  there  is  no  
explanatory variable with problem of collinearity. Therefore, all of the plans can be considered to 
be suitable for bank failure predicting. 
 
Table 4. VIF Figures 
 
Source. Author’s calculations 
 
Variable Plan 52 Plan 61 Plan 64
Nonaccrual rate 1,75 1,70 1,73
Loans and leases variation 1,75
Assets variation 1,31 1,41
Loan diversification 1,38 1,50 1,51
Return on equity 1,22 1,22 1,23
Liquid assets 1,25
Loan exposure 1,44 1,55
Capital growth 1,09 1,08 1,09
Tax exposure 1,18 1,15 1,17
CMO ratio 1,15 1,16 1,14
Uninsured deposits 1,32 1,33 1,33
Risk free securities 1,09 1,09 1,09
Dividend rate 1,10 1,15 1,10
Loan growth 1,13 1,50 1,22
Mean VIF 1,25 1,34 1,30
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As  can  be  seen  from  Table  3  and  4,  plan  52  seems  to  be  slightly  superior  compared  to  other  
plans. Although CC, 95.16%, is same for all key plans, pseudo R2 and ROC characteristics as well 
as mean VIF of the plans are faintly better for plan 52 compared to plans 61 and 64. However, 
long-term analysis still needs to be provided until plan 52 can be considered to be the most 
accurate predicting model. 
 
 
4.3 Long-termAnalysis
 
Although all three plans seem to work well in short-term prediction, it is unclear how well they 
work in the long-term. Therefore, the next step is to run logit analysis for all of the 12 quarters 
prior the bankruptcies. The main focus is on models’ overall predictability not in statistical 
significance of the independent variables. Table 5 below illustrates the results.  
 
Table 5. The Key Plans in the Long Run 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
As could be foreseen, all the plans act similar way and provide results that are significantly 
similar. However, if the mean of the characteristics from all 12 quarters are examined, it can be 
Plan 52 Wald chi2 Prob > chi2 Pseudo R2 CC ROC Plan 61 Wald chi2 Prob > chi2 Pseudo R2 CC ROC
Q1 35,70 0,0004 0,6560 95,16 % 0,9688 Q1 35,06 0,0005 0,6459 95,16 % 0,9659
Q2 43,57 0,0000 0,5153 87,10 % 0,9272 Q2 43,84 0,0000 0,5045 87,10 % 0,9222
Q3 27,27 0,0071 0,5707 88,71 % 0,9417 Q3 36,53 0,0003 0,5436 83,87 % 0,9308
Q4 31,64 0,0016 0,4025 82,26 % 0,8866 Q4 32,06 0,0014 0,4063 83,06 % 0,8837
Q5 38,76 0,0001 0,3807 81,45 % 0,8790 Q5 37,94 0,0002 0,3883 82,26 % 0,8803
Q6 28,36 0,0049 0,2736 75,00 % 0,8223 Q6 29,22 0,0037 0,2811 75,00 % 0,8260
Q7 28,81 0,0042 0,2752 78,23 % 0,8252 Q7 29,30 0,0035 0,2768 78,23 % 0,8275
Q8 21,60 0,0423 0,2471 72,58 % 0,8236 Q8 21,55 0,0428 0,2485 73,39 % 0,8252
Q9 26,39 0,0094 0,2243 74,19 % 0,8054 Q9 24,40 0,0180 0,2236 73,39 % 0,8072
Q10 29,30 0,0036 0,3171 79,84 % 0,8541 Q10 31,69 0,0015 0,3153 79,84 % 0,8520
Q11 32,43 0,0012 0,2845 75,00 % 0,8254 Q11 34,04 0,0007 0,2776 76,61 % 0,8249
Q12 27,93 0,0057 0,2432 71,77 % 0,8171 Q12 27,74 0,0060 0,2426 70,97 % 0,8156
Plan 64 Wald chi2 Prob > chi2 Pseudo R2 CC ROC Mean
Q1 36,46 0,0003 0,6488 95,16 % 0,9672 Plan 52 30,98 0,0067 0,3659 80,11 % 0,8647
Q2 44,45 0,0000 0,4986 87,10 % 0,9170 Plan 61 31,83 0,0138 0,3618 79,50 % 0,8616
Q3 27,27 0,0071 0,5707 88,71 % 0,9417 Plan 64 31,95 0,0066 0,3628 79,91 % 0,8634
Q4 33,64 0,0008 0,4066 83,06 % 0,8837
Q5 35,97 0,0003 0,3715 81,45 % 0,8702
Q6 29,88 0,0026 0,2810 75,00 % 0,8286
Q7 35,22 0,0004 0,2960 75,81 % 0,8392
Q8 17,45 0,1334 0,2450 75,81 % 0,8280
Q9 26,11 0,0104 0,2111 70,16 % 0,7893
Q10 33,69 0,0008 0,2936 74,19 % 0,8358
Q11 35,30 0,0004 0,2761 76,61 % 0,8182
Q12 26,46 0,0092 0,2421 70,97 % 0,8202
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noted that all  measurement of fit  indexes pseudo R2, CC percentage and ROC figure are again 
slightly superior for plan 52 compared to plans 61 and 64. At this point it seems that plan 52 is 
the best option for the final bank failure predicting model.  
 
The next step is to take a careful look at the explanatory variables of the plan. As was mentioned 
plan 52 encloses 12 independent variables: nonaccrual rate, assets variation, loan diversification, 
return on equity, liquid assets, capital growth, tax exposure, CMO ratio, uninsured deposits, risk 
free securities,  dividend rate,  and loan growth.  Table 3 illustrates that  many of the variables are 
not statistically significant in the short-term. It is, however, crucial to examine how the situation 
changes when the time line from the bankruptcies is prolonged. The focus of the analysis is on 
both the statistical significance of the independent variables and the signs and values of the 
discriminant coefficients. Table 6 next page summaries the analysis.  
 
As could be expected nonaccrual rate stands out as a considerably reliable and stable explanatory 
variable. It seems, however, that all the other explanatory variables than CMO ratio and risk free 
securities are exceptionally unstable as the sign and value of the coefficients changes dramatically 
from period to period. This naturally diminishes the credibility of the variable although it might 
be statistically significant at many quarters. Therefore, more precise explanation is provided only 
for those three explanatory variables. 
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Table 6. Plan 52’s Independent Variables in the Long Run 
 
 Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
Nonaccrual rate -77,93269** -65,76568*** -47,91318*** -60,29815*** -94,35348*** -122,8807***
Assets variation 7,287129 -7,011643 -3,198023 0,918106 -10,31932** 1,087165
Loan diversification 1,735756 0,7094394 -0,3438951 0,4960994 0,456459 -0,154095
Return on equity 0,0017253* -0,0000815* 0,044645*** 0,030071 0,0049657 -0,0192315
Liquid assets 4,598661 4,822927 12,53156*** 4,322823 1,354269 1,293459
Capital growth 0,0105052 0,0446541 8,437697** 3,064864 5,069754*** 1,160437
Tax exposure 19,2633 89,47886 -78,29423 -9,912962 -39,99143 -85,38045
CMO ratio -2,966044** -1,41391 -1,085159 -0,5226233 -0,7467394 -0,9734643
Uninsured deposits 5,149105 4,882139 3,988529 -2,354424 -2,678055 -2,084122
Risk free securities 4,648002*** 2,851474*** 2,409734* 1,855624 2,043018 2,447537***
Dividend rate -18,79789 41,63586 52,15787 -11,71733 -2,155777 -0,1022386
Loan growth 7,508367** 3,12273 9,649704 -2,913252 9,125941* -3,845614
Cons. -8,492397 5,944122 1,569046 -0,9927121 10,91415** -0,4564288
Wald chi2(12) 35,70 43,57 27,27 31,64 38,76 28,36
Prob > chi2 0,0004 0,0000 0,0071 0,0016 0,0001 0,0049
Pseudo R2 0,6560 0,5153 0,5707 0,4025 0,3807 0,2736
CC 95,16 % 87,10 % 88,71 % 82,26 % 81,45 % 75,00 %
ROC 0,9688 0,9272 0,9417 0,8866 0,8790 0,8223
Variable Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Nonaccrual rate -95,72772** -80,48797 -86,86967* -178,4092*** -152,0902*** -112,4604**
Assets variation -3,211138 7,620794* -11,87174* -18,06264* -3,137022 -1,340421
Loan diversification -2,145035 -3,593077** -2,590752** -3,00306** -3,542729*** -2,467921*
Return on equity -0,0355807 -0,0330717 -0,0704591** 0,0121248 -0,0961256** -0,0648677*
Liquid assets 1,801145 0,2429351 -0,9707748 -2,245419 -3,187236 -0,8272695
Capital growth 8,980748* -3,53215 0,7809656 -27,47916** -7,118194 1,105367
Tax exposure 105,9084 79,15493 164,9866* 228,9971** 124,5383 28,82668
CMO ratio -0,6870669 -1,615901 -1,471475 -1,596867 -1,50752 -2,018302**
Uninsured deposits -1,587984 -1,36386 -2,803611 -4,6968** -5,138157*** -4,800971**
Risk free securities 2,064974** 1,033945 2,073221* 1,764351 2,263554* 1,822466
Dividend rate 40,22499 23,2639 93,13827 -46,59644 138,8638* 128,9773**
Loan growth -11,92131 -17,59788*** 11,81632 -2,048338 -0,6539087 -1,171042
Cons. 4,604397 -4,435874 13,65452* 21,85833** 7,479117 4,273029
Wald chi2(12) 28,81 21,60 26,39 29,30 32,43 27,93
Prob > chi2 0,0042 0,0423 0,0094 0,0036 0,0012 0,0057
Pseudo R2 0,2752 0,2471 0,2243 0,3171 0,2845 0,2432
CC 78,23 % 72,58 % 74,19 % 79,84 % 75,00 % 71,77 %
ROC 0,8252 0,8236 0,8054 0,8541 0,8254 0,8171
Dependent variable is defined as 0 in the case of failure and 1 otherwise.
Index stars illustrate the significance level of the variables. One star presents 10% level of significance, 
whereas two and three stars state 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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As was stated nonaccrual rate can be seen as one of the measurements of credit risk. Asset 
receives the nonaccrual status when its principal and interest is unpaid for at least 90 days and is 
no longer accruing interest. Different kinds of loans such as real estate, installment, and 
commercial  loans  can  be  considered  to  include  banks’  assets.  As  it  was  noticed  already  in  the  
independent variable analysis, nonaccrual rate is one of the best explanatory variables for the 
bank failure prediction. Also authors Kolari, Caputo, Wagner, Jagtiani, Lemieux, Shin, Lanine, 
and Vennet have successfully included nonaccrual rate variable in their bank failure prediction 
models in the 1990s and 2000s. Implicitly, it is logical that financial institutions face problems 
when their assets no longer accrue interest, since banks make their profit mainly by lending and 
borrowing money. Therefore, it is evident that the more nonaccrual assets there are in the banks’ 
accounts, the greater the probability that the bank will fall into bankruptcy. 
 
The explanatory variable of risk free securities is a ratio of U.S. government debt securities and 
total securities. By definition U.S. Government securities includes U.S. Treasury securities as well 
as U.S. Government agency and corporation obligations. It contains also U.S. government issued 
or guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. (FDIC, 2008) As it seems, the more the bank has tied 
its securities to risk free investments, the smaller the probability of bankruptcy. On the other 
hand, the risky CMO securities tend to increase the probability of the failure. Collateralized 
mortgage obligations are defined as “mortgage-backed securities held-to-maturity at amortized 
cost and available-for-sale at fair value which are either issued or guaranteed through FNMA 
(Fannie Mae) or FHLMC (Freddie Mac), or privately issued and collateralized by mortgage-
backed securities issued or guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA (Ginnie Mae) and all 
other  privately-issued.”  (FDIC,  2008)  Consequently,  it  seems  that  a  bank,  which  keeps  its  
investments in risk free securities instead of risky CMOs has better prospects to avoid the failure. 
 
 
4.4 SimpleModelAnalysis
 
Before the final model can be verified, one more step needs to be taken. It seems that CMO ratio 
has dramatically low statistical significance in the long-term analysis and therefore only two 
independent variables tend to be essential for the bankruptcy prediction. Consequently, the 
model  with  only  nonaccrual  rate  and  risk  free  rate  variables  is  created  and  tested.  In  order  to  
analyze the reliability of the model all 12 quarters are been studied. The results of the analysis are 
provided in Table 7 next page.  
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Table 7. Simple Model’s Independent Variables in the Long Run 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The  logit  analysis  indicates  that  the  simple  model  seems  to  lose  some  of  the  predictability  
compared  to  plan  52.  The  simple  model’s  CC percentage  is  above  required  70% in  only  seven  
quarters out of twelve, whereas plan 52 manages to break 70% cut-off point at every 12 quarters. 
However, in the simple model all explanatory variables are statistically significant through the 
three-year period contrary to plan 52. This can be seen as a valid strength of the model.  
 
As can be seen from Table 7, even slight changes in nonaccrual rate have a major impact on 
possibility of failure of the bank. For example, one quarter prior the bankruptcy the mean of the 
nonaccrual rate is 6.36%, stating that about 6% of banks’ assets have nonaccrual status. If the rate 
rises  only  by  one  percentage  point,  the  chance  to  fail  doubles.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  
nonaccrual rate decreases from six to five percent, the bankruptcy probability goes down by 50%. 
The importance of nonaccrual rate variable seems to increase with time, since five quarters 
before the potential failure one percentage point change in nonaccrual rate increases the 
probability of bank failure by 166%. On the contrary, 100 basis point (bp) decline in nonaccrual 
rate lowers the bankruptcy probability over 60%. Seven quarters prior the possible failure 100 bp 
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
Nonaccrual rate -69,65873*** -67,9112*** -67,38556*** -75,451*** -97,68132*** -108,0926***
Risk free securities 4,33758*** 3,328931*** 3,057069*** 2,298365*** 2,197093*** 2,263842***
Cons 0,4560483 0,3635777 -0,0849264 0,1112892 0,0834568 -0,3266339
Wald chi2(2) 12,13 23,63 37,80 26,56 24,36 19,34
Prob > chi2 0,0023 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001
Pseudo R2 0,5776 0,4701 0,4054 0,3239 0,3022 0,2382
CC 91,94 % 83,87 % 82,26 % 82,26 % 79,84 % 76,61 %
ROC 0,9534 0,9110 0,8770 0,8379 0,8348 0,8044
Variable Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Nonaccrual rate -120,3101*** -112,0131** -109,7247*** -127,3356*** -100,1563*** -97,34172***
Risk free securities 2,263932*** 1,670808** 1,59823** 1,410856* 1,60204** 1,804193**
Cons -0,4912399 -0,3901536 -0,5726825 -0,44387 -0,7655963 -0,9387143*
Wald chi2(2) 14,72 8,60 9,12 11,69 9,70 11,07
Prob > chi2 0,0006 0,0136 0,0104 0,0029 0,0078 0,0039
Pseudo R2 0,1916 0,1188 0,0807 0,0787 0,0564 0,0624
CC 72,58 % 68,55 % 66,13 % 62,90 % 62,10 % 60,48 %
ROC 0,7942 0,7518 0,6857 0,6550 0,6322 0,6397
Dependent variable is defined as 0 in the case of failure and 1 otherwise.
Index stars illustrate the significance level of the variables. One star presents 10% level of significance, 
whereas two and three stars state 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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increase in nonaccrual rate inflates the bankruptcy probability by 233%, whereas the probability 
of bank failure reduces by 70% if nonaccrual rate decreases by one percentage point. If one goes 
further from bankruptcy, the value of CC percentage goes under 70% and the predictability of 
the model comes rather undependable. Therefore, one can argue that only slight changes in 
nonaccrual rate have a tremendous impact on a bank’s probability to fail. However, it is crucial to 
note that 100 bp change in nonaccrual rate reflects approximately 15% change from its average. 
Therefore, it might also be appropriate to test 10bp change in nonaccrual rate. For the first 
quarter 10 bp increase in nonaccrual rate would enhance the bankruptcy probability by 7% and 
10bp decrease  would  reduce  the  probability  by  the  same 7%.  Naturally,  the  effect  will  become 
greater as time from the failure elapses. 
 
The  other  explanatory  variable  that  needs  to  be  studied  is  the  risk  free  securities.  One  quarter  
before the potential bankruptcy one percentage point increase in risk free securities decreases the 
bank failure probability by 4%. The impact is same size, but to different direction when a bank 
ties one percentage point less money for government related securities and places the money into 
some riskier securities instead. As the time elapses, the significance of the variable diminishes. 
From four to seven quarters prior the potential bankruptcy 100 bp change in risk free securities 
have approximately only two percent impact of bankruptcy probability. Therefore, one can argue 
that risk free securities variable does not have as dramatic impact on bankruptcy prediction as 
nonaccrual rate seems to have. In addition, the impact seems to abate in the long-run. However, 
100 bp change in risk free securities corresponds to 10 bp change in nonaccrual rate as the mean 
of risk free securities is roughly ten times greater than the mean of nonaccrual rate. Bearing this 
in mind, the difference of effect between these two variables is not as striking as it looks at the 
first glance. 
 
It is also crucial to note that CC rates as well as all the other measurement of fit characteristics 
seem  to  be  rather  inconsistent  with  time.  For  example,  quarter  6  prior  the  failure  receives  CC  
percentage  of  75,  but  at  quarter  7  the  value  has  improved  to  78%.  The  same  pattern  appears  
between quarters 8, 9, and 10. The trend of CC percentage should point down as time from the 
failure lengthens and the model’s predictability decreases. This is not, however, the case. 
Conversely, CC rates are 72.58%, 74.19%, and 79.84%, respectively. This naturally deteriorates 
the credibility of plan 52. On the other hand, simple model works perfectly when the consistency 
of bank failure prediction is used as a criterion. From period to period the CC percentage lowers 
or  remains  the  same,  but  does  not  increase.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  independent  
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variables, included to the plan 52 but not to the simple model, seem to behave somewhat 
irrationally along with time. This can be explained by the change in the economic state during 
2008 as dramatic escalation of macroeconomic conditions occurred within a year. However, the 
change in economic conditions does not seem to have an impact on predictability of nonaccrual 
rate and risk free securities. As it appears, difficult decision between plan 52 and the simple 
model needs to be made. Whereas plan 52 provides substantial predictability values, the simple 
plan presents high level of model’s stability and statistically significant explanatory variables. 
Figure 6 below illustrates how CC percentage performs in the long-term for both of the models. 
 
Figure 6. Performance of CC in the Long Run 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
 
4.5 ComparisonbetweenLogitandProbitModels
 
The final step is to provide an analysis between logit and probit models. In order to make a 
decision of which one of the methods suites better for the bank failure prediction, probit model 
analysis needs to be executed for both the plan 52 and the simple model. The reliability of the 
method for all 12 quarters is studied with the help of Akaike information criterion (AIC), which 
is defined as 
 
4            ܣܫܥ = 2݇ െ 2ln(ܮ) 
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where k is the number of parameters in the statistical model and L is the maximized value of the 
likelihood function for the estimated model. AIC can be viewed as measures that combine fit and 
complexity.  Given  two  models  fit  on  the  same  data,  the  model  with  the  smaller  value  of  the  
information criterion is considered to be better. (Maddala & Lahiri, 2009)  
 
As can be seen from Table 8 the logit model seems to outperform the probit model for the first 
year prior the failure. Thereafter the models go basically hand in hand. The number of 
independent variables does not seem to affect the results of the analysis. Therefore, one can 
argue that logit model suites slightly better for the bank failure prediction, although the difference 
is subtle between the models. 
 
Table 8. AIC Analysis  
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
4.6 ConclusionoftheEmpiricalAnalysis
 
In the beginning of this section all the independent variables were compared. The analysis was 
conducted by two ways: first the Student’s t-test was applied in order to study differences 
between the means of failed and active banks. The data of 12 quarters was used resulting strong 
or moderate explanation power for 25 independent variables. The test was then verified by the 
logit analysis and the data closets to forthcoming failures. Independent variables were used in the 
logistic regression one at a time. 
 
Plan 52 Logit Probit Simple model Logit Probit
Q1 85,1342 90,8782 Q1 78,6045 84,4408
Q2 109,3232 110,6194 Q2 97,0892 98,7780
Q3 99,8001 100,824 Q3 108,2096 108,4689
Q4 128,7131 129,6915 Q4 122,2223 122,8455
Q5 132,4569 132,4451 Q5 125,9565 126,3666
Q6 150,8769 150,6753 Q6 136,9538 137,2490
Q7 150,5887 150,6873 Q7 144,9650 145,8584
Q8 155,4190 156,5059 Q8 157,4860 158,3402
Q9 159,3369 159,6112 Q9 164,0198 164,1358
Q10 143,3932 143,1964 Q10 164,3668 164,2748
Q11 148,9939 148,4407 Q11 168,1991 168,1002
Q12 156,1005 156,6046 Q12 167,1820 167,0453
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The next step was to minimize the problem of multicollinearity by studying the correlation 
between all statistically significant explanatory variables. With help of the correlation table 72 
different plans were created in order to include all the potential information and without having 
severe correlations between the variables. After running the logit analysis for all the plans, three 
of  them  were  distinguished  the  criterion  being  the  value  of  CC  percentage.  The  long-term  
analysis was then executed for plans 52, 61, and 64 confirming that plan 52 is the most accurate 
plan to predict the bank failures. All the plans offered over 70% prediction accuracy for all 12 
quarters and had CC of 95.16% one quarter prior the bankruptcy. The closer examination 
revealed, however, that majority of the independent variables of plan 52 was rather unstable and 
inconsistent with time. For this reason one more analysis was executed. The last model, namely 
the simple model, showed worsened explanation power as a whole, but offered a tool for closer 
analysis of two most stable and statistically significant independent variables; nonaccrual rate and 
risk free securities. In addition, simple model seems to be very consistent with time as prediction 
accuracy weakened when the time from the bankruptcy elapsed.   
 
Due to statistically strong explanatory power that nonaccrual rate and risk free securities 
provided, the sensitivity analysis could be executed. It proved that nonaccrual rate is substantially 
sensitive for changes and therefore needs to be retained under careful examination. As the value 
of assets with nonaccrual status increases, the bank’s probability to fail rises simultaneously.  Risk 
free securities variable, however, does not seem to be as sensitive to changes as nonaccrual rate, 
although the bankruptcy probability increases as banks invest more heavily on risky securities 
instead of government bills, notes, and bonds. It is notable that the level of investments tied to 
risk free securities can be easily changed whereas nonaccrual rate is the consequence of the 
negligent investment decisions. Therefore, banks should carefully analyze the size and type of the 
loan and the quality of the potential borrower before making the lending decision. 
 
In the final part of the empirical analysis comparison between logit and probit models was 
provided. Logit models seem to be slightly superior compared to probit models, but the 
difference is faint. However, as Aldrich and Nelson (1984) state, there exists a requirement of 50 
observations per parameter in order to produce unbiased logit test statistics. Moreover, Stone and 
Raps (1991) state that in a case of four to six predictors and skewed data, as accounting data is, 
sample size of 200 or more will  be needed to guarantee that  logit  test  statistics will  be properly 
calibrated. Consequently, one can ask if the logit model of plan 52 with 12 explanatory variables 
and only 124 observations responds to these concerns. In this regard, when the sample sizes are 
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small, logit test statistics can be moderately miscalibrated. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
simple model with only two explanatory variables can be seen as a more suitable model for the 
bank failure prediction when the sample size is as small as 124 observations. Relative low degree 
of freedom can also explain the inconsistent CC percentages received from plan 52 as the time 
line form the bankruptcies elapses. 
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5 CONCLUDINGREMARKS
 
Since  2008,  bank  failures  have  caused  general  anxiety  in  the  U.S.  as  several  commercial  banks  
have fallen into bankruptcy between 2007 and 2009. Although there is substantial amount of 
research around bankruptcies, a study including data from the current wave of U.S. bank failures 
was  missing.  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  was  to  study  how  accurately  recent  U.S.  
commercial bank failures can be predicted. The time frame chosen to the study started from one 
quarter  and  ended  to  12  quarters  prior  the  failure,  while  the  logistic  regression  was  used  as  a  
methodology of the analysis. The thesis balanced between predictability of the model as a whole 
and the statistical significance of the independent variables. Also the comparison between logit 
and probit models was provided in order to confirm the hypothesis that the logit model is more 
suitable for bank failure prediction than the probit model. 
 
At the beginning of the study, bankruptcy literature and theory was specifically illustrated. 
Liquidity, credit risk, profitability and taxes, size and growth, loan and deposit mix, securities, and 
instability can be seen as causing the bank failures creating a basis for the independent variables 
applied in the empirical analysis of the thesis. Historical overview of the banking crises was also 
covered  in  order  to  get  clearer  picture  of  the  key  issues  behind  the  bank  failures.  The  main  
finding of the section revealed that the traditional prediction tools for forecasting bank failures, 
with classic financial variables such as return on assets, seem to offer an excellent base for 
bankruptcy prediction analysis. However, the most recent crisis being referred as a subprime 
crisis, also proxies concerning banks’ mortgage related instruments and overall security exposures 
needed to be included to the analysis. 
 
After the historical glance of the banking crises, the evolution of bankruptcy prediction models 
was explored. As illustrated, great variety of bankruptcy prediction models and methodologies 
can be found since the year 1966 when Beaver published his groundbreaking study. One of the 
most well-known, reliable, and accurate method seems to be a logistic regression with the 
financial statement variables. It is essential to note that there are also several other proper 
bankruptcy prediction models than the logit model. As the results suggest, majority of those 
models and methods would, however, require great variety of specialized software and hardware. 
This naturally sets limitations for the appliance of the models. For example, trait recognition 
analysis, neural networks, and genetic programming belong to the branch of machine learning 
techniques.  
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The definition and more precise explanation of the thesis’ methodology were provided in section 
three as well as the data gathering procedure. The data covered all 62 failed banks from 2007 to 
2009 with total assets worth more than 500 million dollars at the time of failure resulting sample 
size of 124, when also the match-pairs were included. 
 
The research question being how accurately recent bank failures can be predicted multiple steps 
had to be performed. The  first  step  was  to  study  the  explanation  power  of  all  of  the  32  
independent variables so that the main elements behind the bank failures could be explored. 
After performing the Student’s t-test and single variable logit analysis, the number of statistically 
significant independent variables diminished to 25. Thus, loan funding, past due loan rate, 
agricultural loan risk, credit card loan risk, demand deposit mix, MBS ratio, and ABS ratio 
variables were considered to be insignificant for the bank failure prediction.  
 
Due to the problem of multicollinearity, 72 different models were constructed in order to sustain 
all relevant independent variables. The short-term logit analysis revealed that three of the models 
were strongest in their explanatory power performing 95.16 % prediction accuracy of the bank 
failures. After examining the pseudo R2 and ROC statistics, one of the models, named as plan 52, 
came to stand out when compared to the two other models. The independent variables of plan 
52 are nonaccrual rate, loan diversification, return on equity, capital growth, tax exposure, CMO 
ratio, uninsured deposits, risk free securities, dividend rate, loan growth, assets variation, and 
liquid assets covering all financial fragility factors. Therefore, it can be argued that the findings of 
the previous researches can be applied also to the 21st century bank failure studies. On the other 
hand, it is interesting to notice that subprime related CMO ratio actually improves the 
predictability and accuracy of the model. As a result it can be stated that banks with substantial 
amounts of assets tied to risky CMO securities are more likely to fail.   
 
In order to strengthen the hypothesis that the model in question is actually the most suitable 
model for bank failure prediction, long-term analysis was provided. As a result it confirms that 
plan 52 really is slightly superior to the other models. Maybe the most significant result of the 
long-term analysis is its finding that although the time frame of the analysis is lengthened to 12 
quarters, the percentage of correctly classified (CC) banks remains at the level of 70. In addition, 
nearly 90 % prediction accuracy is stated although the analysis is performed three quarters prior 
the  bankruptcies.  As  a  result,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  logit  model  estimation  of  forthcoming  
bankruptcies is rather reliable even as early as three years prior the failures. 
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Although the overall predictability of the model is rather substantial, the closer examination of 
the independent coefficients reveals that the majority of the explanatory variables are quite 
unstable and inconsistent with time. This can be explained by the changes in the economic state 
during the year 2008 as dramatic escalation of macroeconomic conditions indeed occurred during 
that year. However, the changes in economic conditions do not seem to have an impact on 
predictability  of  nonaccrual  rate  and  risk  free  securities.  Therefore,  one  more  model  with  only  
these two independent variables was constructed. 
 
After testing the model, it became clear that the overall explanatory power of the model was not 
as strong as plan 52. The simple model, however, seems to be very consistent with time as the 
overall prediction accuracy reduces when the time from the bankruptcy lengthens. The situation 
is rather opposite with plan 52 as its prediction accuracy varies inconsistently with time. For 
example,  six  quarters  prior  the  failure  CC  percentage  is  75,  but  at  quarter  seven  the  value  has  
improved to 78 percent. The same pattern appears between quarters 8, 9, and 10, when the trend 
of CC percentage points upwards as the time from the failure lengthens. This naturally 
deteriorates the credibility of plan 52. On the other hand, the simple model’s CC percentage 
decreases or remains the same, as the time from the bankruptcies elapses.  
 
Nevertheless, the simple plan did provide valuable tools for closer analysis of the causation 
between the independent variables and the bank failures. It was confirmed that the nonaccrual 
rate is more sensitive for changes and therefore needs to be kept under careful examination. Risk 
free securities ratio, however, does not seem to be as responsive to changes as nonaccrual rate. 
On the other hand, it is crucial to understand that the ratio of government debt securities to total 
securities can be easily increased in order to reduce bankruptcy probability, whereas inflated 
nonaccrual rate should be seen as a long-term consequence of the careless lending decisions. 
Therefore, the bank needs to manage its lending processes to keep the nonaccrual rate level low 
and to invest mainly in risk free securities in order to avoid bankruptcies. The outcome is logical 
and supports the theory of bank failures. 
 
Finally, it was tested if logit model is more suitable for bank failure prediction than probit model. 
According to the hypothesis, the accounting data used in the empirical analysis is not usually 
normally distributed suggesting that the logistic regression is preferable methodology for 
bankruptcy prediction. As was presented the differences between the models seem to be rather 
faint, but logit models nevertheless stand out as slightly superior compared to probit models.  
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For the future research more sophisticated bank failure prediction methods than logistic 
regression should be used. It would be interesting to study whether there is a difference between 
the  results  of  this  thesis  and  the  results  of  a  research  made  with,  for  example,  neural  network  
learning  algorithm  or  genetic  programming.  It  would  also  be  fascinating  to  test  the  model  
constructed here for the future bank failures. In addition, it would be interesting to explore 
banks’ total subprime exposure and include it to the dataset in order to improve the accuracy of 
the prediction model. As was mentioned, the task is practically impossible at the moment so new 
kinds of regulations are required to do so.  
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Appendix1.Student’st-testofIndependentVariablesbetweenFailed
andActiveBanks
 
Liquid assets Uninsured deposits Loan exposure Loan funding Nonaccrual rate Past due loan rate Loan loss allowance
Q1 0,0016 0,0497 0,1281 0,9309 0,0000 0,2967 0,0000
Q2 0,0037 0,1053 0,3559 0,6777 0,0000 0,4279 0,0000
Q3 0,0288 0,0803 0,1801 0,2995 0,0000 0,4050 0,0000
Q4 0,1503 0,0514 0,0619 0,1699 0,0000 0,1866 0,0000
Q5 0,2272 0,0378 0,0754 0,0691 0,0000 0,6643 0,0003
Q6 0,2533 0,0600 0,0337 0,0576 0,0000 0,6649 0,0402
Q7 0,2508 0,0672 0,0317 0,0621 0,0000 0,8013 0,1131
Q8 0,2890 0,0661 0,0724 0,1297 0,0007 0,6325 0,5527
Q9 0,4548 0,0064 0,1925 0,1479 0,0059 0,7996 0,5874
Q10 0,3049 0,0001 0,1201 0,1330 0,0034 0,4391 0,4686
Q11 0,2471 0,0001 0,0847 0,0894 0,0245 0,3978 0,6039
Q12 0,2304 0,0000 0,0442 0,1066 0,0281 0,6019 0,5027
Provision rate Loss rate Capital ratio Return on assets Return on equity Dividend rate Net interest margin
Q1 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0025 0,0627 0,0000
Q2 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,4496 0,0822 0,0000
Q3 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0565 0,0019
Q4 0,0000 0,0000 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,1695 0,1549
Q5 0,0001 0,0012 0,0027 0,0000 0,0000 0,3694 0,4425
Q6 0,0559 0,1242 0,0636 0,0184 0,0235 0,8707 0,6917
Q7 0,0602 0,3637 0,1440 0,0454 0,0660 0,6086 0,6583
Q8 0,1028 0,9194 0,3595 0,5584 0,6511 0,6784 0,8704
Q9 0,7456 0,8556 0,5897 0,8932 0,5213 0,3156 0,8037
Q10 0,8003 0,6988 0,5632 0,9404 0,6355 0,5750 0,9349
Q11 0,9203 0,5610 0,6605 0,9578 0,6555 0,1100 0,7967
Q12 0,5097 0,9405 0,4415 0,9454 0,5103 0,1249 0,6112
Net operating margin Tax exposure Capital growth Loan growth Commercial loan risk Real estate loan risk Agricultural loan risk
Q1 0,0000 0,0043 0,3731 0,0093 0,1041 0,0143 0,7967
Q2 0,0000 0,0000 0,8787 0,0035 0,1945 0,0182 0,8519
Q3 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0992 0,0140 0,9878
Q4 0,0000 0,0000 0,0008 0,0346 0,1327 0,0163 0,9512
Q5 0,0000 0,0002 0,0001 0,0651 0,1507 0,0188 0,9862
Q6 0,0132 0,0717 0,4038 0,5754 0,1633 0,0195 0,9021
Q7 0,0240 0,0989 0,0324 0,1007 0,0806 0,0083 0,8794
Q8 0,3795 0,4191 0,4609 0,0061 0,0476 0,0050 0,9949
Q9 0,8054 0,8010 0,3475 0,1559 0,0466 0,0081 0,9064
Q10 0,7446 0,3289 0,0084 0,2631 0,0434 0,0073 0,9078
Q11 0,7510 0,2967 0,0119 0,1170 0,0354 0,0056 0,9814
Q12 0,7540 0,7327 0,2281 0,8277 0,0307 0,0053 0,9142
Credit card loan risk Loan diversification Demand deposit mix Time deposit mix MBS ratio ABS ratio CMO ratio
Q1 0,4996 0,0014 0,3946 0,0000 0,7646 0,4068 0,0543
Q2 0,4861 0,0020 0,0703 0,0000 0,5310 0,5998 0,0460
Q3 0,4666 0,0030 0,0540 0,0000 0,3185 0,9146 0,0104
Q4 0,5331 0,0030 0,1251 0,0002 0,3836 0,7801 0,0308
Q5 0,5041 0,0044 0,4486 0,0013 0,1661 0,8467 0,0148
Q6 0,5294 0,0038 0,2473 0,0055 0,1468 0,8841 0,0291
Q7 0,4783 0,0023 0,1113 0,0107 0,1897 0,9150 0,0765
Q8 0,5644 0,0009 0,2040 0,0081 0,1963 0,8100 0,1188
Q9 0,7370 0,0006 0,3295 0,0018 0,1812 0,7767 0,1225
Q10 0,6951 0,0004 0,2147 0,0013 0,1880 0,7628 0,2433
Q11 0,6580 0,0004 0,4667 0,0011 0,2010 0,8116 0,2279
Q12 0,7320 0,0003 0,5592 0,0014 0,3740 0,7918 0,1129
Risk free securities Asset variation Loans and leases variation Equity variation
Q1 0,1751 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Q2 0,1128 0,1231 0,0029 0,9319
Q3 0,0647 0,0004 0,0000 0,0000
Q4 0,0839 0,0234 0,0305 0,0000
Q5 0,0539 0,9879 0,3445 0,0001
Q6 0,0337 0,8395 0,8530 0,2895
Q7 0,0501 0,2554 0,0412 0,4444
Q8 0,0348 0,5016 0,3882 0,7009
Q9 0,0724 0,9160 0,3264 0,8703
Q10 0,1615 0,0039 0,0765 0,0041
Q11 0,0931 0,0590 0,2234 0,0446
Q12 0,0416 0,2940 0,8340 0,0846
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Appendix2.CorrelationbetweentheKeyIndependentVariables
 
 
nonacc~e netope~n return~s netint~n provis~e lossra~e loanlo~e capita~o loansa~n
nonaccrual~e 1,000
netoperati~n -0,696 1,000
returnonas~s -0,5916 0,8973 1,000
netinteres~n -0,6296 0,5791 0,554 1,000
provisionr~e 0,5503 -0,8088 -0,684 -0,293 1,000
lossrate 0,589 -0,8199 -0,703 -0,349 0,822 1,000
loanlossal~e 0,657 -0,630 -0,5574 -0,3189 0,6072 0,583 1,000
capitalratio -0,602 0,661 0,7233 0,6739 -0,4959 -0,4846 -0,463 1,000
loansandle~n -0,341 0,427 0,4379 0,2262 -0,4125 -0,4388 -0,423 0,515 1,000
assetsvari~n -0,3754 0,4682 0,448 0,197 -0,419 -0,418 -0,319 0,3835 0,6278
loandivers~n 0,4063 -0,2494 -0,189 -0,275 0,219 0,286 0,2875 -0,3187 -0,1387
realestate~k 0,366 -0,266 -0,2212 -0,4794 0,1133 0,1001 0,035 -0,436 -0,019
commercial~k -0,2621 0,128 0,067 0,195 -0,052 -0,158 -0,1275 0,2863 0,187
timedepos~x 0,539 -0,467 -0,4238 -0,534 0,2991 0,3323 0,440 -0,470 -0,293
liquidassets -0,265 0,308 0,2067 0,0762 -0,2996 -0,1607 -0,160 0,121 0,0223
loanexposure 0,2585 -0,2329 -0,152 0,043 0,2544 0,126 0,106 -0,059 0,132
returnoneq~y -0,3942 0,4421 0,198 0,221 -0,459 -0,456 -0,2505 0,2759 0,2507
equityvari~n -0,4345 0,5303 0,461 0,324 -0,583 -0,518 -0,2672 0,5062 0,3154
capitalgro~h 0,23 -0,1148 -0,094 -0,161 0,078 0,130 0,0145 -0,1111 -0,0413
taxexposure -0,2387 0,154 0,140 0,244 -0,321 -0,128 -0,2832 0,2271 0,0774
cmoratio 0,0259 -0,0178 -0,061 -0,166 0,059 -0,014 0,0159 -0,2048 0,0093
uninsuredd~s 0,2837 -0,3086 -0,231 -0,3217 0,346 0,241 0,2157 -0,2197 -0,0354
riskfreese~s 0,1059 -0,0254 0,011 -0,1176 -0,028 -0,070 -0,0517 0,0605 0,0204
dividendrate -0,1602 0,1667 0,166 0,2075 -0,134 -0,140 -0,1503 0,3075 0,2806
loangrowth -0,1465 0,1354 0,179 0,229 -0,092 -0,178 -0,2214 0,2977 0,5351
assets~n loandi~n reales~k commer~k timede~x liquid~s loanex~e return~y equity~n
assetsvari~n 1,000
loandivers~n -0,136 1,000
realestate~k -0,0993 0,7177 1,000
commercial~k 0,137 -0,626 -0,4874 1,000
timedepos~x -0,1588 0,4442 0,398 -0,2323 1,000
liquidassets 0,1379 -0,2715 -0,273 0,0888 -0,122 1,000
loanexposure -0,266 0,382 0,393 -0,1004 0,109 -0,793 1,000
returnoneq~y 0,256 -0,165 -0,157 0,1897 -0,2274 0,1312 -0,045 1,000
equityvari~n 0,346 -0,203 -0,1926 0,131 -0,2238 0,1559 -0,108 0,787 1,000
capitalgro~h -0,013 0,104 0,0775 -0,075 0,1135 -0,0465 0,038 -0,143 -0,093
taxexposure -0,053 -0,196 -0,2518 0,120 -0,1691 0,1169 -0,061 0,026 0,067
cmoratio 0,071 0,051 0,0607 0,102 0,1033 0,1778 -0,197 -0,022 -0,230
uninsuredd~s -0,026 0,380 0,423 -0,184 0,3657 -0,1806 0,206 -0,119 -0,192
riskfreese~s -0,023 -0,055 0,1224 0,183 0,1278 -0,0357 0,125 -0,035 0,094
dividendrate 0,163 -0,172 -0,142 0,143 -0,1736 -0,0428 0,000 0,067 0,073
loangrowth 0,205 -0,059 -0,0151 0,072 -0,2647 -0,1532 0,247 0,121 0,166
capita~h taxexp~e cmoratio uninsu~s riskfr~s divide~e loangr~h
capitalgro~h 1,000
taxexposure 0,000 1,000
cmoratio -0,068 -0,086 1,000
uninsuredd~s -0,010 -0,296 0,165 1,000
riskfreese~s 0,080 -0,013 -0,215 -0,051 1,000
dividendrate -0,020 0,112 -0,102 -0,170 0,070 1,000
loangrowth -0,038 0,086 -0,081 -0,052 0,073 0,093 1,000
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Wald chi2 Prob > chi2 Pseudo R2 CC ROC Wald chi2 Prob > chi2 Pseudo R2 CC ROC
Plan 1 34,64 0,0005 0,6682 92,74 % 0,9670 Plan 37 50,07 0,0000 0,6785 91,13 % 0,9727
Plan 2 47,95 0,0000 0,6463 91,13 % 0,9602 Plan 38 75,58 0,0000 0,6282 88,71 % 0,9592
Plan 3 46,37 0,0000 0,6243 92,74 % 0,9592 Plan 39 47,80 0,0000 0,6418 92,74 % 0,9641
Plan 4 51,21 0,0000 0,6412 90,32 % 0,9584 Plan 40 65,68 0,0000 0,6372 89,52 % 0,9584
Plan 5 74,23 0,0000 0,6994 91,94 % 0,9716 Plan 41 52,23 0,0000 0,7304 92,74 % 0,9784
Plan 6 51,37 0,0000 0,5802 91,94 % 0,9472 Plan 42 67,36 0,0000 0,6079 90,32 % 0,9592
Plan 7 36,90 0,0002 0,6683 92,74 % 0,9677 Plan 43 48,21 0,0000 0,6784 91,94 % 0,9729
Plan 8 49,39 0,0000 0,6470 91,13 % 0,9625 Plan 44 83,87 0,0000 0,6267 87,90 % 0,9584
Plan 9 45,39 0,0000 0,6352 92,74 % 0,9592 Plan 45 41,61 0,0001 0,6258 92,74 % 0,9620
Plan 10 56,64 0,0000 0,6412 90,32 % 0,9584 Plan 46 76,26 0,0000 0,6376 91,13 % 0,9592
Plan 11 67,09 0,0000 0,7104 91,94 % 0,9742 Plan 47 58,21 0,0000 0,7155 91,94 % 0,9774
Plan 12 47,82 0,0000 0,5994 91,94 % 0,9511 Plan 48 43,27 0,0001 0,5953 91,13 % 0,9581
Plan 13 47,21 0,0000 0,6810 91,94 % 0,9727 Plan 49 34,04 0,0007 0,6533 94,35 % 0,9680
Plan 14 66,43 0,0000 0,6500 91,13 % 0,9631 Plan 50 47,00 0,0000 0,6485 91,94 % 0,9599
Plan 15 48,72 0,0000 0,6284 91,94 % 0,9605 Plan 51 59,33 0,0000 0,6579 91,13 % 0,9644
Plan 16 51,21 0,0000 0,6412 90,32 % 0,9584 Plan 52 35,70 0,0004 0,6560 95,16 % 0,9688
Plan 17 66,77 0,0000 0,7280 93,55 % 0,9774 Plan 53 47,94 0,0000 0,6488 91,13 % 0,9615
Plan 18 55,63 0,0000 0,5916 89,52 % 0,9502 Plan 54 59,48 0,0000 0,6878 91,94 % 0,9701
Plan 19 44,26 0,0000 0,6794 93,55 % 0,9727 Plan 55 40,96 0,0001 0,6698 91,94 % 0,9729
Plan 20 70,45 0,0000 0,6510 91,13 % 0,9633 Plan 56 65,55 0,0000 0,6530 91,13 % 0,9641
Plan 21 50,06 0,0000 0,6393 92,74 % 0,9631 Plan 57 56,94 0,0000 0,6903 91,94 % 0,9722
Plan 22 69,65 0,0000 0,6431 90,32 % 0,9586 Plan 58 35,02 0,0008 0,6699 93,55 % 0,9729
Plan 23 66,74 0,0000 0,7352 91,13 % 0,9789 Plan 59 68,89 0,0000 0,6536 91,13 % 0,9638
Plan 24 55,05 0,0000 0,6088 91,94 % 0,9581 Plan 60 59,59 0,0000 0,7159 90,32 % 0,9758
Plan 25 34,06 0,0007 0,6631 92,74 % 0,9664 Plan 61 35,06 0,0005 0,6459 95,16 % 0,9659
Plan 26 46,40 0,0000 0,6195 88,71 % 0,9553 Plan 62 45,43 0,0000 0,6243 87,90 % 0,9568
Plan 27 41,19 0,0001 0,6308 92,74 % 0,9602 Plan 63 57,44 0,0000 0,6782 91,94 % 0,9677
Plan 28 49,91 0,0000 0,6329 89,52 % 0,9563 Plan 64 36,46 0,0003 0,6488 95,16 % 0,9672
Plan 29 66,43 0,0000 0,7050 92,74 % 0,9714 Plan 65 47,37 0,0000 0,6227 88,71 % 0,9563
Plan 30 43,34 0,0000 0,5929 92,74 % 0,9527 Plan 66 59,95 0,0000 0,6774 92,74 % 0,9672
Plan 31 34,37 0,0006 0,6639 93,55 % 0,9677 Plan 67 44,67 0,0000 0,6651 92,74 % 0,9716
Plan 32 48,90 0,0000 0,6176 89,52 % 0,9542 Plan 68 70,91 0,0000 0,6340 88,71 % 0,9594
Plan 33 40,21 0,0001 0,6193 92,74 % 0,9545 Plan 69 49,96 0,0000 0,7104 91,94 % 0,9750
Plan 34 56,26 0,0000 0,6331 90,32 % 0,9560 Plan 70 42,02 0,0001 0,6663 92,74 % 0,9729
Plan 35 69,78 0,0000 0,6975 91,94 % 0,9719 Plan 71 79,77 0,0000 0,6325 88,71 % 0,9581
Plan 36 38,98 0,0002 0,5854 91,13 % 0,9514 Plan 72 55,31 0,0000 0,6984 91,13 % 0,9727
